There’s not enough rail lines and gas pipelines from Russia to feed them with significant quantities of fossil fuels.
Imagine how bad Russias invasion of Ukraine would’ve been without energy independence and food security. The invasion of Taiwan is an order of magnitude more difficult, and Taiwan now has the recipe for how to knock out the entire naval fleet of a more powerful nation (see how Ukraine has essentially incapacitated Russia in the Black Sea).
I do not think China could survive a blockade.
If renewables was adequate they would not be importing vast amounts of oil.
But ultimately, it's about hardware+industry - current trend = regional force balance shifting in PRC favour vs US+co every year with no end in sight. PRC better off accumulating capabilities at scale, not just regional, but global (i.e. prompt global strike) and increase autarky (less net population + more electrifcation = more calorie + energy security). All trend incentivizes waiting and building.
TLDR waiting and building becomes less costly (or rather less risky) to pursue PRC's ultimate strategic goals associated with TW scenario... displacing US posture out of east Asia and perhaps hitting CONUS infra at scale as response to US intervention. The latter part is key, there are important stretch goals to TW scenario that secures PRC geopolitical interests for 50-100+ years. It's much more important to be able to tackle those "costly" scenarios "cheaper", where cheaper is also relative to making intervention much more expensive for adversaries, i.e. PRC "winning" hand in TW scenario is to show US posture in east asia not sustainable, and CONUS (including TSMC Arizona) not defendable.
If you then ask yourself whether China would rather invade during the Trump administration (with its tendencies towards isolationism and "deal making") or roll the dice on a subsequent U.S. administration, you might find yourself thinking that the odds actually seem considerably higher than 25% that this could happen in the next four years.
To the extent that this narrative comes via the U.S. intelligence/defense community, one has to assume that it may biased towards exaggerating the threat. I for one hope that is the case, since I do not want to see a U.S.-China conflict any time soon. At the same time, I unfortunately don't think it's likely to be completely baseless.
[1] https://media.defense.gov/2023/Apr/24/2003205865/-1/-1/1/07-...
[2] See, e.g., https://cimsec.org/the-maritime-convoys-of-2027-supporting-t...; https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4547637-china-potential-t...