But it is a security problem in the same way that “curl | bash” is a security problem. An even closer equivalence might be something like “curl | bash” in your bashrc.
But it is a security problem in the same way that “curl | bash” is a security problem. An even closer equivalence might be something like “curl | bash” in your bashrc.
If you trust where you are curling from, and you trust everyone they trust and that they definitely haven't been hacked, then great! Blindly eval that code! That's what I do :)
Bear in mind that, like many bits of security advice, this is highly context-dependent. It may vary based on your risk tolerance, your level of trust in the vendor, how robust other parts of your infrastructure (e.g. threat monitoring tools, network segmentation, etc.) are.
Besides, while I appreciate the efforts of the distro package maintainers, they are overworked and can't really give the amount of care this huge pile of software in the repository needs, not to mention that sometimes their efforts are counterproductive (IIRC Debian used to deliberately break some terminfo(5) records to work around problems in some other packages). And I definitely remember reading an article (though I can't for the love of me to find it) about a Linux distro doing an automated switch from some sort of RPM-like packaging to straight-up using Flatpak, with predictably horrible results of lots and lots of broken software.