Why FAA and EASA didn't require any procedure changes in the interim to prevent the issue is a very good question.
I like Mentor Pilot and Air Disasters, so I know I’ve heard of a few where the problem that caused an accident was already known and a fix was available but the airline just chose not to do it because they had that option. Or it was scheduled but hadn’t been performed yet because it wasn’t thought to be that critical.
Having the FAA mandate the fix seems like it would be a much better option.
The timeframe could be anything, but common forms are like:
- Within the next X (flight) hours or Y calendar days
- You don't have to, but additional inspection needed every X hours or Y days until you do
- At next annual inspection
- Immediate/before flying again (usually called an Emergency AD)
I haven’t heard of any similar successful court cases in recent years in the US.
For USA [4], Title 14 of Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter I Subchapter C, Part 39
For EU [5] Article 76 (6) of the Basic Regulation (EU) 2018/1139
[1] https://www.icao.int/publications/pages/doc7300.aspx [2] https://ffac.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ICAO-Annex-8-Airw... [3] https://ffac.ch/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ICAO-Annex-6-Oper... [4] https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-14/chapter-I/subchapter-C... [5] https://www.easa.europa.eu/en/document-library/regulations#b...
I read through the 787 Dreamliner manual for setting up the software for patch distribution to the planes, and there are checks and overrides at every step. The whole thing is physically controlled by the owning airline or maybe the leasing company, but not Boeing.
I wasn’t thinking a “we’re pushing an update too bad” kind of thing but more a “hey you have to do this to be allowed to fly, your choice” with the weight of law behind it.
The security is dialed up to 11 as well. It explicitly calls out the following scenario:
1) The plane is leased. 2) the maintenance is outsourced. 3) The plane at an airport in an "unfriendly" country. 4) The plane is not allowed to take off until it is patched due to an emergency directive.
That scenario is handled, securely!
There is encryption between the plane and the airport WiFi.
The maintenance crew can also plug in to an Ethernet port near the front landing gear.
There is a VPN back to the patch server managed by the airline.
The VPN host certificate is explicitly whitelisted in the plane.
The plane won't accept a patch unless it has been digitally signed by Boeing, the FAA, the Airline, and potentially the manufacturer and the local equivalent of the FAA!)
The pilot has to enter a 4-digit pin code in the plane.
Most of the associated wiring is only physically connected if there is weight on the front landing gear. You can't "hack" a plane in-flight and patch it with malware, the required cabling isn't connected.
They are coordinated with applicable certification bodies (civil aviation authorities) and distributed as airworthiness directives that can, in fact, force a specific action to be taken.
[1] (writing from memory unfortunately) an airflow modification for 737 NG (iirc, could be older 737, pre-MAX definitely) avionics bay was "optional", as in mandatory only for aircraft flying in hot enough regions. After a near miss in Poland when steadily overheating avionics essentially slowly lobotomized a plane after takeoff. Turned out europe got hot enough for it.
After that incident, Boeing issued a change in safety information bulletin that the modification was now mandatory.