> a window into their reasoning
Reasoning? Or just more generative text?
Reasoning? Or just more generative text?
I am willing to accept arguments that are not appeals to nature / human exceptionalism.
I am even willing to accept a complete uncertainty over the whole situation since it is difficult to analyze. The silliest position, though, is a gnostic "no reasoning here" position.
We absolutely do: it's a computer, executing code, to predict tokens, based on a data set. Computers don't "reason" the same way they don't "do math". We know computers can't do math because, well, they can't sometimes[0].
> Since it looks like reasoning, the default position to be disproved is this is reasoning.
Strongly disagree. Since it's a computer program, the default position to be disproved is that it's a computer program.
Fundamentally these types of arguments are less about LLMs and more about whether you believe humans are mere next-token-prediction machines, which is a pointless debate because nothing is provable.
Since we know it is a model that is trained to generate text that humans would generate, it writes down not its reasoning but what it thinks a human would write in that scenario.
So it doesn't write its reasoning there, if it does reason its behind the words and not the words itself.
Additionally, the new "reasoning" models don't just train on human text - they also undergo a Reinforcement Learning training step, where they are trained to produce whatever kinds of "reasoning" text help them "reason" best (i.e., leading to correct decisions based on that reasoning). This further complicates things and makes it harder to say "this is one thing and one thing only".
On the contrary - extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. That LLMs are performing a cognitive process similar to reasoning or intelligence is certainly an extraordinary claim, at least outside of VC hype circles. Making the model split its outputs into "answer" and "scratchpad", and then observing that these to parts are correlated, does not constitute extraordinary evidence.
It's not an extraordinary claim if the processes are achieving similar things under similar conditions. In fact, the extraordinary claim then becomes that it is not in fact reasoning or intelligent.
Forces are required to move objects. If i saw something i thought was incapable of producing forces moving objects then the extraordinary claim starts being, "this thing cannot produce forces" not "this thing can move objects".
It's that something doing what you ascertained it never could changes what claims are and aren't extraordinary. You can handwave it away, i.e "the thing is moving objects by magic instead" but it's there and you can't keep acting like "this thing can produce forces" is still the extraordinary claim.
I don't even necessarily think we disagree on the conclusion. In my opinion, our notion of "reasoning" is so ill-defined this question is kind of meaningless. It is reasoning for some definitions of reasoning, it is not for others. I just don't think your shift of the burden of proof makes sense here.
Text generated after a decision to “explain” it is largely nonsense.
Each token the model outputs requires it to evaluate all of the context it already has (query + existing output). By allowing it more tokens to "reason", you're allowing it to evaluate the context many times over, similar to how a person might turn a problem over in their heads before coming up with an answer. Given the performance of reasoning models on complex tasks, I'm of the opinion that the "more tokens with reasoning prompting" approach is at least a decent model of the process that humans would go through to "reason".
It keeps the story from wandering, but it's not a qualitative difference in how text is being brought together to create the illusion of a fictional mind.