>People figured out that yes, they had run the machines out of memory, specifically with the push - the distribution of new bytecode to the web servers. Other people started taking steps to beat back some of the bloat that had been creeping in that summer, so the memory situation wouldn't be so bad. I suspect some others also dialed back the number of threads (simultaneous requests) on the smaller web servers to keep them from running quite as "hot".
Cross-functional information exchange. Who is coordinating or directing all these disparate actions? Who is fusing the knowledge gained from these actions? Who is disseminating a clearer picture of "what really happened"? Who is using that updated picture to frame new taskings for all the people doing these independent investigations? The answer to all those questions should be "the staff in the War Room", and the leadership in the War Room in particular. My take-away is that the author is arguing that their ability to pursue single-function actions within their domain of expertise was optimized in their work environment, and was degraded in the War Room. They aren't wrong.
>I guess a "war room" might work out if you have a bunch of stuff that has to happen to deal with a possible "crisis" and then it's just a matter of coordinating it. You don't have people doing "heads-down hack" stuff nearly as much in a case like that.
Exactly. Coordinating a bunch of stuff for crisis management = put those people in the War Room. Focused heads-down tasks = put those people where they can ...focus. Now that said....one thing I've come to HATE about working in a military headquarters is open offices for everyone who isn't the G-shop lead and his/her deputy. Everyone else is shoved into a cubicle farm, probably with ESPN blaring in the background on top of a half-dozen conversations and people constantly dropping by your desk to BS about cover sheets for TPS Reports. So even if you're NOT in the War Room, you can't focus.