Basically, if you imagine this as a table of "user's name, date of birth, and address" keys mapping to genomic and other data, the key was replaced with a random identifier that could not be trivially joined to recover the user name, date of birth, and address.
These systems are not robust against motivated and capitalized adversaries.
Note that selling deidentified data (genomic, health, etc) is common in the industry already and 23&Me is hardly unique in this respect.
There is considerable confusion about the distinction between aggregated data and de-identified individual-level data. I would say that I don't consider sufficiently aggregated data to be "your data" in a particularly meaningful personal sense of "your", even though there are still some re-identification risks from these types of datasets.
I was contesting the statement that "The data has already been sold... [and] the damage is already done" which I still think is highly misleading.
I don't think 23andme has been casual or callous with people's data; they are probably a step above the average firm that handles this sort of data. The consent process is well-documented.
My complaint has always been about 23&Me has always been Anne Wojciki's naivete about the utility of genomic data for health treatment, as well as whether her company needed to work with the government (she wrote a useful retrospective that helped shed light: https://hbr.org/2020/09/23andmes-ceo-on-the-struggle-to-get-...).
Most of us who worked in genomics at the time were sort of dumbfounded by her approach and wanted to know what magic she had that let her get as far as she did with the company and its product.
I don't have any problem with the family history side of the product; that's how my dad found out that he had a number of unexpected children (IVF through donated sperm) who were able to connect with him years after their conception. And I really wish disease genetics had turned out to be far more straightforward as I've long been fascinated with how complex phenotypes arise from genomes.
I think we've generally been pretty careful to present only scientifically well supported results, which has not helped the perceived utility of our health product. There are certainly valid arguments to be had about the business model.
Just a note that re-identifying aggregate data is a whole field of study that is decently successful.
Homomorphic encryption enables standard GWAS workflows (not just summary stats) while “sharing” all genotypes and phenotypes. Richard Mott and colleagues have a paper and colleagues on this method;