These regimes attract the least competent people possible because those people know that so long as they're sufficiently loyal, they'll never be accountable for competence. It's a great opportunity for exactly the people you don't want making important decisions!
Mattis, Tillerson, Barr, Acosta, Azar, Pompeo, Kelly, Mnuchin are all (surprisingly) god-tier thinkers compared to the current clown car.
Understand they literally don't care about opsec, nor is there much reason why they should. It's an exercise to continue justifying military budgets and contractor and manufacturer enrichment. Any secrecy at best just is there to hide how thinly veiled the reasoning is, which doesn't need much bother because anyone open to finding out can quickly ascertain. It's just not supposed to be said openly for diplomatic and political reasons.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/houthi-stri...
>, wasting tens (hundreds?) of millions of dollars and dozens of civilian lives on an unsuccessful attack,
A mistake would be to think this isn't success. The point is to spend lots of money to justify and enrich the bloated defense sector.
None of this is relevant to whether it was proper, legal, or risky to plan an attack via Signal.
From your initial comment:
> [the Houthis] have no air defense - False
> [there is] no risk of meaningful counter attack — False
> Understand they literally don't care about opsec — False, the Signal chat referred to some files being transmitted highside (i.e. properly), so clearly they literally do care
> nor is there much reason why they should — False, unless you regard "mitigating the risk of American equipment and potentially pilots getting shot down" as "not much reason," in which case we just disagree on axioms
True. They have since Obama shot down less than what, one drone a year? This is no air defense and your own evidence confirms it. At best it serves as a rare annoyance but is strategically defenseless. You are simply wrong.
>there is] no risk of meaningful counter attack — False
True. They have not once strategically gained a victory on the US nor do they have means to do so.
>Understand they literally don't care about opsec — False, the Signal chat referred to some files being transmitted highside (i.e. properly), so clearly they literally do care
True. They invite journalists and use poorly vetted signal channels.
>nor is there much reason why they should — False, unless you regard "mitigating the risk of American equipment and potentially pilots getting shot down" as "not much reason," in which case we just disagree on axioms
True, even with leaks the best they can do is extraordinarily rarely shoot down non piloted drones.
>None of this is relevant to whether it was proper, legal, or risky to plan an attack via Signal.
I did not claim that it was....
My thesis is the Houthis are the next easy way to unload massive defense funds with little strategic risk. Their lack of air defenses and no need for opsec informs the cabinet's laxadasical treatment.
The lack of investigation is an exemplar mechanism by which incompetence is allowed to rise to the top of regimes like this one.
There's no 5D chess. These people are just incompetent. Your gripes about the military-industrial complex are irrelevant.
We are in 99% agreement depending on framing. By my or your standard what they did was bad and incompetent. I'm judging by the standards for which they are selected -- burning budget to keep the right people paid. At that they are quite competent and agilely shift from Ukraine to further incursion in the ME. In this endeavor, bad opsec is competence as evacuating the target creates further opportunity for operations. The odd drone getting shot down would even be desirable from this view.
>Your gripes about the military-industrial complex are irrelevant.
They are relevant because they help you understand the criteria of competence and understand the one for which they were selected. You or I hypothetically may be better at opsec but we would be incompetent since we would not diligently work to achieve my gripes.
Have a good day!
https://www.defensenews.com/news/your-military/2024/09/16/ho...
So opesec, against all enemies, is important. Not just for diplomatic and political reasons. For OPERATIONAL (the op in opsec) reasons.
Perhaps you can explain the operational meaning of the bombing campaign.
yeah no that's not how any of this works. You don't get to chose what's going through official channels and what's going through signal based on how you feel about the target capabilities
because it makes it easy to stovepipe sensitive information to Moscow, Beijing, et al.
because they're lazy and stupid.
and they're not justifying it because they don't have to, since there are not any meaningful consequences -- like jail or dismissal.
People mistakenly believing that the issue is using Signal rather than simply accidentally adding a journalist is one of the major hallmarks of this case.
—
“So that we’re clear, one of the first things that happened when I was confirmed as CIA director was Signal was loaded onto my computer at the CIA, as it is for most CIA officers,” Ratcliffe said. “One of the first things that I was briefed on very early, senator, by the CIA Records Management folks was the use of Signal as a permissible work use. It is. That is a practice that preceded the previous administration to the [former President Joe] Biden administration.”
Signal is used for things like "get to a SCIF to discuss" or "what do you want from Starbucks?"
It is not to be used for any non-public information:
> Unmanaged 'messaging apps,' including any app with a chat feature, regardless of the primary function, are NOT authorized to access, transmit, process non-public DoD information. This includes but is not limited to messaging, gaming, and social media apps. (i.e., iMessage, WhatsApps, Signal).
https://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Library/Memo-...
Sorry but it's clear that in addition to — again — skirting the substance of the conversation, your barometer for just how security-conscious these types of organizations are is completely out of whack.
If you think the CIA’s own SOE goes against the CIA’s own guidelines, then yes there is indeed somebody tremendously, fabulously, loudly ignorant about how securities conscious these organisations are. That’s not me either.
If you work at a healthcare organization, you may have Slack, but that doesn't necessarily mean you can message people's PHI.
At a financial institution, you may have email, but that doesn't necessarily mean you can email PII.
At CIA, you may have Signal, but that doesn't mean you can discuss ongoing military operations in it.
I have already linked to policy that explicitly says non-public DoD information is not approved for Signal.
I find it literally not believable that you don't understand this concept, so I'll have to chalk this one up to motivated reasoning damaging your ability to interpret English.
You can read it here: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/guidance-mo...