Once Europe returned to the gold standard, it saw widespread deflation and consequent unemployment, particularly in the UK and Germany. The effects of deflation caused by a return to the gold standard, and related issues in the US and France which accumulated much of world gold reserves, is widely considered a major cause of both the Great Depression and the rise of fascism. Notably, deflation contributed to a rapid trade deficit increase in Germany.
Some light reading:
https://www.cato.org/blog/world-war-i-gold-great-depression
https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/did-france-cause-great-depres...
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/germanys-trade-surplus-is...
It kicked the can down the road for half a century. It bought a lot of time. This approach, of betting on a miraculous solution in the future, is deeply ingrained in policy making; it’s not unique to the neoliberal reform. In fact, the next solution could just be figuring out how to kick the can again.
The next phase looks like it will entail gov intervention, by issuing loan guarantees, or by mandating the investment of national savings into specific industries, like manufacturing and energy. Capital misallocation and the return of stagflation will lead to another crisis, but in a few decades from now.
Pegging to gold by itself doesn’t really solve anything, if the overarching system remains based on relentless exploitation by selfish interests. Sooner or later, overdraft facilities will emerge for gold that doesn’t exist; so, the traumatic cycles of boom and crash will be repeated. Not to mention the deflationary dynamic, which will overwhelmingly favour those who already own gold. In general, you can’t de-politicise monetary policy (by fixing its supply), without inevitably amplifying the overarching system.