In this case, there's an avalanche of money and resources backing up the problem domain DNSSEC attempts to make contributions in, and the fact that it's deployed in practically 0% of organizations with large security teams is telling.
Unfortunately, DNSSEC is a bit expensive in terms of support burden, additional bugs, reduced performance, etc. It will take someone like Apple turning DNSSEC validation on by default to shake out all the problems. Or it will take an exploitable vulnerability akin to SIM-swapping to maybe convince Let's Encrypt! and similar services reliant on proof-by-dns that they must require DNSSEC signing.
(The biggest problem in this thread is that you can bypass the rate limit but nobody else can)
At this point, your statements border on intentional dishonesty. Please be more truthful and responsible in your statements.
Hijacking by whom? Very few are really running a validating recursive resolver.