There is also no reason we can't have both.
There is also no reason we can't have both.
(Actually getting it to work reliably without downgrade attacks would be more work, but notably, that's work DNSSEC would have had to do too --- precisely the work that caused DANE-stapling to founder in tls-wg.)
There's still a chicken-and-egg problem with getting a valid TLS certificate for the DNS server, and limiting DNSSEC just for that role might be a valid approach. Just forget that it exists for all other entry types.
But if you have DoH chaining all the way from the recurser to the authority, it's tricky to say what stapled DANE signatures are even buying you. The first consumers of that system would be the CAs themselves.
This way, it can be used to guarantee the integrity of the resolution path without first getting a certificate from a CA.