You claim it is fine-tuned, but it has happened in the real world. It is actually even better for attackers that it is "obscure", because that means it is harder to detect.
> but assume that the hijacker is only so powerful as being able to impersonate a specific DNS server and not the server that the DNS server tells you about.
Yes, all layers of the stack need to be secure. I am not making assumptions about the other layers - this thread is about DNS.
> if the CA is capable of using any information to detect that this might be a forgery
They are not. The only mitigation is "multi-perspective validation", which only addresses a subset of this attack.
> And of course, the proposed solution doesn't do anything to protect against other kinds of DNS hijacking
Yes, because other kinds of DNS hijacking are solved by HTTPS TLS. If TLS and CAs are broken, nothing is secure.