The much-more-important problem is that the most important zones on the Internet are, in the DNSSEC PKI, irrevocably coupled to zones owned by governments that actively manipulate the DNS to achieve policy ends.
This is a problem with TLS too, of course, because of domain validation. But the WebPKI responded to that problem with Certificate Transparency, so you can detect and revoke misissued certificates. Not only does nothing like that exist for the DNS, nothing like it will exist for the DNS. How I know that is, Google and Mozilla had to stretch the bounds of antitrust law to force CAs to publish on CT logs. No such market force exists to force DNS TLD operators to do anything.
My (ahem) "advocacy" against DNSSEC is understandably annoying, but it really is the case that every corner of this system you look around, there's some new goblin. It's just bad.