1. Unsanitized data included in agent context
2. Foundation models being unable to distinguish instructions and data
3. Bad access scoping (cursor having too much access)
This vulnerability can be found almost everywhere in common MCP use patterns.
We are working on guardrails for MCP tool users and tool builders to properly defend against these attacks.
They are not responsible only in the way they wouldn't be responsible for an application-level sql injection vulnerability.
But that's not to say that they wouldn't be capable of adding safeguards on their end, not even on their MCP layer. Adding policies and narrowing access to whatever comes through MCP to the server and so on would be more assuring measures than what their comment here suggest around more prompting.
This is certainly prudent advice, and why I found the GA example support application to be a bit simplistic. I think a more realistic database application in Supabase or on any other platform would take advantage of multiple roles, privileges, Row Level Security, and other affordances within the database to provide invariants and security guarantees.