It's missing the basics: encrypt your disks and store the key on the TPM, so that you don't even know it and it can be used to automatically the decrypt the disk on boot.
I am against the key in tpm. If they steal the whole box, your data is theirs. Disk encryption with key in tpm is like locking your door but intentionally leaving the keys in the door
And it increases the risk of losing your data if you have a hardware failure or even some software update wierdness (depending on exactly how you configure the TPM: did you know windows takes the disk encryption key out of the TPM and writes it onto the drive in plaintext during some update processes?)
What threat does this protect against?
It protects against people imagining your disks and reading them / asking you for the encryption key / brute forcing the encryption key.
Accessing all of your data without any authentication by anyone who gets physical access to your machine/server/computer.
Stolen or lost disks, obviously. More practically when the disk dies or replaced for other reason, you don't have to worry about the contents, because it's all random.