The dynamics of a House whose member's districts are small enough (30,000) to not require a lot of money to run a campaign (just knock on doors and put up signs) compared to the current situation that makes them spend almost all their time begging for money and avoiding being the target of other people's money? That is fairly straightforward. They can buck the President and the Party, because they don't need their money for their constituents to know them.
>I don't think John Adams, Lincoln, or FDR held anything close to the view that "Congress tells me what to do, and I do it."
I provided a comprehensive and convincing document arguing that such an understanding did in fact exist in the late 1700's and the 1800's, specifically in terms of the meaning of "Executive Power" in Article II. My loose phrasing should not be where an argument should be hung.
Let me take a bit more time.
The 18th-century evidence reviewed in this law article pretty clearly shows that "executive power" just meant the power to execute laws. This didn't appear to be in contention; from radical Whigs to hardcore royalists agreed on this basic definition.
Some specific evidence: Blackstone's Commentaries, which Madison called "the book which is in every man's hand," flat-out defined executive power as "the right of enforcing the laws." That's it.
Blackstone carefully listed over thirty different royal prerogatives—war powers, foreign affairs, pardons, AND executive power. Just one item on that long list, not some umbrella term for everything.
Every single Founding-era dictionary backs this up. They all defined "executive" as having pwer to act or carry laws into execution. Not one included foreign affairs or war powers. When they specifically defined "executive power" as a legal term---it was always about implementing laws or putting plans into execution.
Even Ryalists e.g Robert Filmer agreed with this narrow definition, dismissed mere executive power as beneath a true monarch (!!) calling it just "a power of putting laws in execution by judging and punishing offenders."
The actual term for the Crown's broader powers was "the royal prerogative," not "executive power." Everyone understood that executive power was inherently subordinate to legislative power—it was an empty vessel that could only execute what the legislature authorized.
So the argument goes that the modern Vesting Clause Thesis basically makes a linguistic mistake. Sure, people called the king "the executive" because he had the executive power, but that doesn't mean all his other powers were therefore "executive."