It’s my take that over the past ~ decade a lot of these companies have been making things a lot better, Windows even requires secure boot these days as well.
It’s my take that over the past ~ decade a lot of these companies have been making things a lot better, Windows even requires secure boot these days as well.
That’s the path out of this mess: not just trying to catch it on NPM but moving sensitive data into OS-enforced sandboxes (e.g. Mac containers) so every process you start can’t just read a file and get keys, and using sandboxing features in package managers themselves to restrict when new installs can run code and what they can do (e.g. changing the granularity from “can read any file accessible to the user” to “can read a configuration file at this location and data files selected by the user”), and tracking capability changes (“the leftpad update says it needs ~/.aws in this update?”).
We need to do that long-term but it’s a ton of work since it breaks the general model of how programs work we’ve used for most the last century.
Using OS features to restrict access to sensitive data similarly gives you another chance to detect a compromise because a denied operation to, say, read your wallet by an app which doesn’t need to is both highly visible and unambiguous.
The problem is coming from inside the house.
Secure Enclave = store the encryption keys to media in a place where you can't get them
Secure Boot = first step towards remote attestation so they can remotely verify you haven't modified your system to bypass the above
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Is there such a thing as secure hardware that can prevent supply chain attacks (by enabling higher layers to guarantee security) and secure hardware that prevents copying data (by enabling higher layers to guarantee security)?