- Authority assertion
- False urgency
- Technical legitimacy
- Security theater
Prompt injection here is like a phishing campaign against an entity with no consciousness or ability to stop and question through self-reflection. - Authority assertion
- False urgency
- Technical legitimacy
- Security theater
Prompt injection here is like a phishing campaign against an entity with no consciousness or ability to stop and question through self-reflection.Both trick a privileged actor into doing something the user didn't intend using inputs the system trusts.
In this case, a malicious PDF that uses prompt-injection to get a Notion agent (which already has access to your workspace) to call an external web-tool and exfiltrate page content. Tjhis is simialr to CSRF's core idea - an attacker causes an authenticated principal to make a request - except here the "principal" is an autonomous agent with tool access rather than the browser carrying cookies.
Thus, same abuse-of-privilege pattern, just with different technical surface (prompt-injection + tool chaining vs. forged browser HTTP requests).
The current problem is that making the models resistant to "persona" injection is in opposition to much of how the models are also used conversationally. I think this is why you'll end up with hardened "agent" models and then more open conversational models.
I suppose it is also possible that the models can have an additional non-prompt context applied that sets expectations, but that requires new architecture for those inputs.
Any distinctions inside the document involve the land of statistical patterns and weights, rather than hard auditable logic.