Clearly, if only 10% of the list was real, it would be pretty easy to validate that with a small random sample.
Clearly, if only 10% of the list was real, it would be pretty easy to validate that with a small random sample.
The way due diligence should have found this is that it should have been written all over the financials. What do you mean you have 4 million customers and a support staff of 20? What do you mean you have 4 million customers but your revenue is {clearly too low}? What do you mean you have 4 million customers but your website spend is {clearly too low}?
It's over an order of magnitude. It should be written all over the company. Experienced DD should have smelled a rat within about 2-3 hours, although nailing it down could take much longer. The logical conclusion I draw is that there was no experienced DD done. In isolation this would a tough claim, however, I look around and I see a lot of Wall Street activity on this time frame that shows no evidence of Due Diligence being done and it seems to be part of a pattern.
(The question of why there was no DD is a separate one.)
Beyond that, JPMorgan didn’t want to push too hard and risk blowing up the deal as there was competitive pressure. Calling out “these numbers seem odd” could have spooked Jauvice, and they figured the reps & warranties in the contract gave them enough protection if things went south.
This isnt about inactive data, they had an outside data scientist create an artificially generated usage dataset!
JPMorgan thought they were getting legitimate users of the product at some point in time - they didn't care whether or not they were currently active, hence vetting ops didn't really matter much.
Not far off from "you can't inspect the business you're buying too hard, or the deal is off." And just like with individual scams, that should be a sign that it's shady and you should bail out.
You can of course hold to a particular standard, but if a competitor is willing to relax that standard, you lose a distinct advantage.
Risky decisions happen all the time in business, as long as the risk is outweighed by the perceived reward.
if the scam is not going to hurt the agent (in this case, the CEO responsible for the buy out), and the success is going to reward the agent, then the incentives are not completely aligned between the agent and the principle.
So signing the deal with less due diligence, then correcting it later (if needed) seems more profitable to the agent, while the principle takes all of the losses (if any).
To be fair, Jamie Dimon also fits this description.
This entire case can be explained thusly: “JPM had FOMO during ZIRP and agreed to a stupid deal without doing proper due diligence.”
This deal would’ve never happened if rates had not been cut to 0%.
Sure to the rest, but: Whatsapp had 55 employees and 450 million users when it was acquired. It's at least conceivable to tell a story (lie) that's two orders of magnitude smaller. (And the real number was "only" off by one zero.)
Also, more obviously, people you knew were using it every day. 450M is different than 4M, and way different than 300K. If Whatsapp were lying and saying they had 4.5B users, I'd expect JP Morgan to catch that within a few hours, too.
Sure. But the point is, Whatsapp had 0.5 total employees per 4 million users, and Frank had 20 support employees per 4 million supposed users.
Even if you think Whatsapp has a massive advantage, those numbers don't make it look like Frank is the one that's lacking in staff.
> Also, more obviously, people you knew were using it every day. 450M is different than 4M, and way different than 300K. If Whatsapp were lying and saying they had 4.5B users, I'd expect JP Morgan to catch that within a few hours, too.
For these reasons it would be much harder for Whatsapp to lie that way.
The corollary of that is it would be much easier for Frank to do it.
WeWork had the opposite problem. A lot of employees and expenses and not enough paying users. Having lots of employees and lots of expenses by itself doesn't mean much. WeWork still got billions in funding. Due diligence was an issue there as well.
JPM regularly acquires businesses that do not look like WhatsApp and look more like Frank. For 99% of the acquirers out there, seeing a business with $450m in ARR with 55 employees definitely makes your eyes bulge.
Apparently they also had some kind of service to submit an aid appeal letter to the student's financial aid office. This is also a ridiculous service for low-income students to pay for because I can almost guarantee that Frank wouldn't have the context necessary to actually convince a college's financial aid administrators to give more money to one of their users.
It's almost as if the people considering the deal might have been focusing more on the financial education aspects of Frank instead of how they actually would interface with the FAFSA.
DD guy here.
This is more common then people think. M&A deal dynamics are funny and this is usually a tactic that investment bankers who represent sellers use. According to my cursory research she didn't use an investment banker. For someone fresh out of biz school with no M&A/banking experience that's umm...BOLD.