Because your bank isn't even trying to be secure, relative to what's considered industry standard.
Be grateful while it lasts.
Be grateful while it lasts.
I think the government and large businesses like it that way, as it makes the mobile network providers as a sort of credit check (or “are you worth dealing with”) mechanism.
The whole point of 2FA was to have two devices that you own. Now the bank is forcing your login and 2FA to be on the same device. Which is the easiest device to steal.
What about SMS is somehow worse than that?
It is extremely common for people's phone numbers to be stolen (even if temporarily), and then their bank accounts drained.
What scenario does a kiosk at the mall get control of my phone number but not control of my phone? I don't see how remote attestation solves anything here. Does the bank suddenly know a stranger is holding my phone?
We go from me needing to open a web browser on my computer and getting verified on my phone, to now my most important operations have to be from my phone. That's worse.
> The scam begins with a fraudster gathering personal details about the victim .... the fraudster contacts the victim's mobile telephone provider. The fraudster uses social engineering techniques to convince the telephone company to port the victim's phone number to the fraudster's SIM. This is done, for example, by impersonating the victim using personal details to appear authentic and claiming that they have lost their phone.
SMS 2FA should simply not be used if one cares about security.
You can e.g. smooth-talk the customer service at a kiosk to give you replacement SIM card for the one you've "lost".
This is why banks increasingly don't trust your phone number, and their apps tie themselves to the phone itself, i.e. to hardware and OS IDs. But to trust those IDs, they need the phone to pass remote attestation.
If yours doesn't, pick one that does.