Granted, there are a lot of trivialities in this example, but it's pretty representative of how such programs are supposed to work.
Granted, there are a lot of trivialities in this example, but it's pretty representative of how such programs are supposed to work.
Now, rewind. The situation is the same, but nearby is a recruiter. The man walks by again, not noticing the job board. The recuiter does not flag him down. Now the woman walks by and the recruiter walks up to her and interests her in company X. She takes her ideal job and is happy. The man takes a job at company Y, for less pay, and is unhappy.
When programs like the one briefly mentioned in the article are done well their net effect is really signalling more than anything. As trivial as it sounds, such signalling can actually have a large impact.
I would hope that the recruiter isn't, in fact, signalling something along the lines of, "your odds of getting hired at this company are greater than your equally talented male friend." If I were receiving that much extra recruiting attention because of my gender, that is the impression I would get.
However, your second paragraph sort of has things backwards. The current scheme of things strongly signals to women (pretty accurately) "your odds of getting hired are lesser than your equally talented male friend." Such signalling as I described before isn't about saying that their odds are better than their male friend but rather that the company is actively trying to not disadvantage women.
Do you have some sort of evidence for this? Anecdotally, talented female programmers stay on the market far shorter than males do. Most companies desire a gender balance, which makes the limited stock of female programmers more vlauable.