> The program launched in 2018 to replace the aging computer system used across VA’s health care network, which serves more than 9 million veterans, with an off-the-shelf product that could handle many of the same tasks: organizing important information including appointments, referrals, prescriptions and patient histories.
> David Shulkin, the secretary at the time, announced that VA would negotiate a contract to buy the records system from Cerner without competitive bidding. VA leaders said they selected the program because the Pentagon already had purchased a similar Cerner system for the military’s more than 700 hospitals and clinics.
One of the interesting things about this is that, from my perspective, VistA's sort of a mesh of servers rather than the hierarchy we might expect from a federal system. Perhaps that's because of the complex interplay between federal and state and local laws. But anyway, there's probably a "station" for VistA near you that serves your area, and that's very similar (though not identical) to the "station" in the next neighboring area/metropolis/state/whatever.
But weirdly it seemed like the plan to roll this out was to replace all of the functionality at a given VistA station, rather than to do a strangler fig sort of thing and work on supplanting VistA's functionality in a specific functional area (whether locally or nationally). I don't know if that's because of the aforementioned complexity of laws, or the complexity of how the system(s) is/are administered, or other reasons that would elude me.
It's, uh, it's a fun situation.
I think the bigger problem is that we're not meaningfully grappling with the reality of what it takes to replace legacy government systems.
Another grain of sand on the beach of things that we're completely unequipped to deal with, I guess.
This has led to somewhat of an arms race where government workers desperately collaborate with contractors to find a way to sidestep or subvert the bid process and other contractors aggressively seek to inspect and enforce the process.
Developing in-house governmental talent, institutional knowledge, and capacity is of course strictly off the table, as it would reduce opportunities for private profit in basic government services.