you may consider reading I am a strange loop for that, which can do far better justification than myself
if there's surely no algo to solve the halting problem, why would there be maths that describes consciousness?
if there's surely no algo to solve the halting problem, why would there be maths that describes consciousness?
Having read “I Am a Strange Loop” I do not believe Hofstadter indicates that the existence of Gödel’s theorem precludes consciousness being realizable on a Turing machine. Rather if I recall correctly he points out that as a possible argument and then attempts to refute it.
On the other hand Penrose is a prominent believer that human’s ability to understand Gödel’s theorem indicates consciousness can’t be realized on a Turing machine but there’s far from universal agreement on that point.
I'll try and ask OG q more clearly: why would the brain, consciousness, be formalizable?
I think there's a yearn view nature as adhering to an underlying model, and a contrary view that consciousness is transcendental, and I lean towards the latter