Can't be taken seriously if you're going to elide that "detail".
The platform’s direct financial incentives are almost identical to malicious state actors’: to foment extreme engagement. It is not a secret to anyone that people engage most actively with outrage.
Content moderation costs money directly, then costs engagement indirectly.
I’m genuinely confused by your comment.
You said X has no incentive to allow foreign influence ops. Very clearly, not only do they have an incentive to allow them, but they have an additional disincentive to disallowing them (cost).
The fact those aligned incentives originate from different ultimate goals is totally irrelevant for as long as the two are aligned.
A Chinese owned TikTok simply doesn't follow the same calculus. If the CEO of Bytedance (note different from the CEO of TikTok) gets a order flood the platform with anti-Taiwanese propaganda right before China invades Taiwan, the CEO would have to follow through even if it causes the value of TikTok to zero. The ban was not about how much harm TikTok has done already, it's about how much harm they can do in a worst case scenario.
Beyond that, you're just asserting a bunch of assumptions as if they're fact.
And all of this is irrelevant. I never argued TikTok/X/Meta are the same. The issue I raised is you positioning 2016 enforcement action as evidence of X's current enforcement posture and then suggesting there is some compliance motivation here (there isn't – there's no relevant law to comply with as far as USG is concerned) and suggesting there's no incentive to allow foreign ops (there is, as demonstrated).
Like this US one?
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-covi...