Not having email change functionality would have been a huge usability, security, and customer service nightmare for us.
Regardless of anything else, not enabling users to change their email address effectively binds them to business with a single organization. It also ignores the fact that people can and do change emails for entirely opaque reasons from the banal to the authentically emergent.
ATO attacks are a fig leaf for such concerns, because you, as an organization, always have the power to revert a change to contact information. You just need to establish a process. It takes some consideration and table topping, but it’s not rocket science for a competent team.
In your analogy, the claim would be that some online account is tied to a laptop and whoever possesses the laptop has access to that account. The online service does not permit the account owner to revoke access from that laptop and move the account to a different laptop. I stand by my statement that this would be a serious security hazard. Because yes, laptops can and do get hacked or stolen, just like email addresses.
Where your analogy isn't quite as strong is that at least you can generally add additional anti-theft protections such as full-disk encryption to a laptop, while with an email account generally 2FA is the best you can do.