But on the timing point - that’s actually my exact argument. The 19% CGT decline from £16.9bn (2022-23) to £13.7bn (2024-25) happened BEFORE Labour’s October 2024 rate increases. The decline occurred under the Conservative government while rates were still at the “low” levels you criticised.
That’s precisely the problem: revenues were already falling when rates were at 10%/20%. Then Labour increased them to 18%/24% in October 2024, likely accelerating the decline further (we’ll see in the next fiscal year’s data).
So the revenue decline can’t be blamed on Labour’s rate increases - it happened before them. Which suggests either:
1. Even the “low” rates were still high enough to trigger behavioural responses, or 1. Other factors (non-dom changes announced, anticipated tax increases, international competition) were already driving capital flight
Either way, it supports the Laffer curve thesis: the tax base was shrinking before the rate increases, and those increases are unlikely to reverse the trend.
The OBR’s £7.5bn shortfall report (March 2025) specifically attributes this to behavioural factors beyond just asset prices, which is why they classified £4.5bn as structural rather than temporary.
What’s your read on why CGT revenues fell 14% in 2023-24 if rates hadn’t changed yet?