I have stopped using the HSBC app and asked for a security device (which they will send you if asked) instead and use the web site instead.
EDIT: there's also Android Protected Confirmation that works in the TrustZone so apps can't display over that. It was made exactly for apps like banking apps, so they should use it.
Using overlay permissions, it's relatively simple to trick someone into transferring money by overlaying a different UI that the malicious app makes the user type or paste into. I believe blocking access to the app while such an overlay is present makes a lot of sense. Trusting apps from Google Play to do this while blocking other install sources would be an obvious mistake, though.
I'd argue this feature shouldn't exist (because of things like the API you mention) but having a user override doesn't make sense here.
※ I'm aware expecting HSBC to follow the law would be extremely naive given their track record.
Accessibility settings are a tricky one since that's a separate law. I wonder if they whitelist screen reader apps from the official app store. Anyway that's not the case in the original article.
Number of people using F-Droid + a banking app is approximately zero in comparison.
There is not the slightest chance in hell that taking on the legal risk from F-Droid users is a sensible use of the bank's resources.
Sources: https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what-we-do/crime-thre... https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/threats-2025/nsa-frau...