> 17 Feb 2026 11:32 PST A rollout is going to prevent issuance from occurring. We will provide an estimate on when issuance will stop.
> 17 Feb 2026 12:14 PST Issuance is beginning to stop. A fix to resolve the issue will roll out in about 8 hours
> 17 Feb 2026 11:32 PST A rollout is going to prevent issuance from occurring. We will provide an estimate on when issuance will stop.
> 17 Feb 2026 12:14 PST Issuance is beginning to stop. A fix to resolve the issue will roll out in about 8 hours
Mozilla root store policy: https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/secu...
Chrome root store policy: https://googlechrome.github.io/chromerootprogram/
Apple root store policy: https://www.apple.com/certificateauthority/ca_program.html
Baseline Requirements: https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/blob/main/docs/BR.md
There are countless examples of non-compliant certificates documented in the Bugzilla component I linked above. A recent example: a certificate which was backdated by more than 48 hours, in violation of section 7.1.2.7 of the Baseline Requirements: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2016672
There are countless Bugzilla reports of clearly unprofessional CAs trying to get away with doing whatever they want, get caught, say "it's no big deal", fail to learn the lesson and eventually get kicked out, much to the chagrin and bewilderment of their management, irate that some nerds on the Internet could ruin their business, failing to understand that following the scripture of the Internet nerds is the #1 requirement of the business they chose to run.
In my experience every case in the Web PKI where we found what seems obviously to be either gross incompetence or outright criminality there were also widespread technical failures at the same CA. Principles who aren't obeying the most important rules also invariably don't care about merely technical violations, which are easier to identify.
For example, CrossCert had numerous technical problems to go along with the fact that obviously nobody involved was obeying important rules. I remember at one point asking, so, this paperwork says you issue only for (South) Korea, but, these certs are explicitly not for Korea, so, what technical measure was in place to ensure you didn't issue them and why did it fail? And obviously the answer is they didn't give a shit, they'd probably never read that paperwork after submitting it, they were just assuming it doesn't matter...
"There is an ongoing incident that will force issuance to be halted."
Feels like they were alerted to some current problem severe enough that "turn it off now" was the right move. Breaking the baseline requirements somehow maybe?