JWT theft / 60-minute window: This is a real concern, and it's the same tradeoff every token-based system makes (OAuth2, Auth0, Firebase — all use similar TTLs). The mitigations are standard: TLS in transit, short-lived tokens (TTL is configurable, 60m is the default not the floor), instant server-side revocation via Redis blocklist, and single-use nonces to prevent replay. Token binding to client fingerprint/IP is on the roadmap.
Could someone steal a JWT in transit? Over TLS, that requires compromising the endpoint itself at which point you have bigger problems than token theft. The same attack vector applies to every bearer token system in production today.
The bottom turtle: You're right that cryptographic identity alone doesn't solve root trust who vouches for the agent at registration? This is exactly why we shipped human verification. Agents can link verified human identities (GitHub OAuth, Google, Worldcoin proof-of-personhood) to their passport. That's the bottom turtle: a real, verified human is accountable for what their agent does.
Is it perfect? No. But the current state is literally nothing no identity, no verification, no audit trail, no revocation. Going from zero to a cryptographic identity layer with risk scoring + human accountability is the same "0 to 1" jump that cookies and OAuth were for the web. The alternative isn't a better system it's no system at all.
Appreciate the pushback, this is exactly the kind of scrutiny that makes the design better. If you have specific attack vectors in mind beyond JWT theft, genuinely interested to hear them.