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MK-TME allows having memory encrypted at run time, and the platform TPM signs an attestation saying the memory was not altered.

Malicious code can't be injected at boot without breaking that TPM.

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Subject to the huge caveat that the attacker does not have physical access. https://tee.fail/

An interesting implementation flaw, but not a conceptual problem with the design.

Well, it kind of is actually. The previous iteration of the design didn't have that vulnerability but it was slower because managing IVs within the given constraints adds an additional layer of complexity. This is the pragmatic compromise so to speak.

Does it count as a conceptual problem when technical challenges without an acceptable solution block your goal?

This is excellent. The ability to trick remote servers into believing our computers are "trusted" despite the fact we are in control will be a key capability in the future. We need stuff like this to maintain control over our computers.

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