Hacker News Reader

Comment by fluidcruft | Hacker News Reader

I'm of pretty mixed feelings about this. It certainly strengthened Europe's collective defense priorities and awareness. That response happens to include NATO but primarily because Europe is too weak without NATO. Europe used to be full of world powers and now they collectively can't manage collective defense without the US? There's something very learned-helplessness about that.

And yes, it certainly has served America's interests to have a weak Europe that's dependent on it. But seeing that as "good will" seems like a distortion.

View on HN

Europe's weakness is mostly in their heads. The US is the most powerful military in the world, but the second most powerful military is NATO without the US. If the rest of NATO pulls together and reorganises into an effective military that doesn't depend on the US, it would be a force to be reckoned with.

Europe could easily defeat Russia without outside help (look at how well Ukraine is doing with far less!), but we still fear Russia because that's what we're used to. That's what we were told to do and what we have embraced. We need to grow out of that and stand on our own feet again.

> Europe could easily defeat Russia without outside help (look at how well Ukraine is doing with far less!)

Ukraine has received unbelieviable levels of aid from NATO, esp. the US.

10000+ Javelin missiles, WW3 levels of cluster munitions that were slated to be decommissioned in the US, multiple factories in the EU making shells that go straight to the AFU (e.g. Bulgarian 152mm), etc.

there is no way they'd have made it 6+ months let alone 4 years without the US' heavy backing.

Much of their support has also come from the EU, and the EU has a lot more than that. The EU has more fighters and ships, more tanks, more soldiers. It is true that the EU didn't and still doesn't have deep ammo reserves, though. But it has far more capacity to ramp up production of these than Russia has; the Russian economy is about the size of that of the Benelux.

> It is true that the EU didn't and still doesn't have deep ammo reserves, though

Indeed it is true. But it is also changing, the stockpiles are growing.

Absolutely. The EU is now finally but rapidly adapting to these geopolitical changes. Defense budgets are now far higher than the 2% that used to be the goal that nobody met.

In the 1990s everybody was eager to believe that war was finally and forever over. Some held on to that delusion for a bit too long, but not anymore.

Merkel has a lot to answer for. Handel durch wandel... pull the other one. After Grozny there should have been absolutely no doubt.

Eastern European countries warned us, but western Europe, Germany in particular, but other western European countries too, assumed Russia was now a normal country we could just trade with. Under Yeltsin we might have been heading in that direction, but Chechnya should have been a warning. Putin's comment about "countries that don't matter" was a warning. Russia taking chunks out of Georgia should have been the alarm. We continued trading even after he took Crimea and Donbas. We have been way too naive.

Politically, absolutely. Fortunately the intelligence communities are not as stupid as the politicians they serve.

That's not true. Even including military aid to Ukraine, EU average defence spending remains at 1.9%.

It's also the most expensive region in the world to raise a military.

That was the 2024 figure. In 2025 it rose to 2.1% and this year it is expected to rise further.

And that's just the direct allocation, not the under water part including venture funding of some of the defense industry (obvious overlap: anything including AI & drones, it's pure VC bait).

What are you talking about, 2025 defence spending is coming in below 2024

That's straight from the EU figures.

No way we are below 2024, the trend is accelerating, not diminishing.

Is it true? Most analyses show EU stockpiles overall still falling, especially for precision weapons.

Reporting is messy and due to the EU's fragmented linguistic nature harder to come by than it probably should be.

The balancing act is to increase stockpiles whilst supplying Ukraine which is consuming almost as fast as we're producing. Precision weapons you are right about, those are dwindling, but at the same time this is the one area where Ukraine internal production is beginning to outnumber imports (and their motivations are not so much quantity as 'no strings attached', which is very understandable).

Artillery shell production is up, 2.2 million shells/year or thereabouts, but here too the Ukraine war is consuming them very fast, either way, it is sixfold or so of what it was prior to 2022. Many new factories have been built and opened and are since a few months adding their output to the stream.

I think what held things back for a bit is that the EU was - wrongly - under the impression that Putin would back off but now that it is clear that that is not the case the longer term investments make sense. But it took a while for that to get underway.

This is absolute fantasy. Stockpiles are only depleting, production hasn't and won't come close to meeting demand, and until there's a shooting war inside the bloc, it won't.

Unless you are privy to secrets at a level that they contradict the EU official figures + the figures from the defense contractors that I am tracking this is as accurate as I can make it.

I do not have access to information from the military other than what gets published but that's good enough for me as long as I don't see contradictions.

Here is one article from a while ago:

https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/04/07/rheinme...

They were aiming for a 100% supply to Ukraine + stockpile increase for 2026 and I see no reason to disbelieve that other than your comment, if you want me to re-calibrate my position on that you're going to have to supply some sources.

The ~2M figure was a 2025 EOY nameplate capacity target, not actual output for the year. Even those capacity numbers are widely overstated - it’s well known in defence circles (where you claim to be) that real capacity is running at about 40% of official claims, with some shortfalls being made up by international procurement, but the majority remaining unfulfilled.

As for EU motivations, Orbán is the visible blocker, but the Western states are even more constraining than Hungary. It’s Spain, Ireland, Germany, France, etc. that have no appetite for war or economic upheaval, which would immediately topple governments across the bloc. EU defence policy requires unanimity across states, and it doesn’t exist.

Rhetoric is strong but thin, and almost everybody apart from yourself sees it. Let’s come back to this in a year, when production figures and defence spending for 2025 become public and see.

>"but the second most powerful military is NATO without the US"

I am curious how much of NATO's hardware originate from the / depends on the US and and what will suddenly stop working if the US decides to break military alliance.

Short answer is: a LOT, but that's a two way street. BAE, for example, builds America's tanks (or at least their armored infantry fighting vehicles).

BAE Systems Inc, a US-based subsidiary that operates entirely in the US and whose leadership operates under an SAA which means they report to the US Government and the parent in the UK.

It's not like they will suddenly stop working completely, but some do depend on US data, which could be cut off. No idea if they have a fall back solution for that, but I'm sure they're working on that.

Kissinger warned about this in 1969:

> Tutelage is a comfortable relationship for the senior partner, but it is demoralizing in the long run. It breeds illusions of omniscience on one side and attitudes of impotent irresponsibility on the other

Maybe a bit of learned helplessness, but what people tend to forget is that an all-in Russia is a formidable enemy.

This is the moment it helps to have allies. Like an insurance. Even if you can manage without, it hurts less if you have them.

To me it makes more sense to focus on that perspective.

> but what people tend to forget is that an all-in Russia is a formidable enemy

So you're saying they've been keeping their best in reserve?

Reply on news.ycombinator.com