This is really not good enough. The real gigantic problem with supply chain risk is not that you get tricked to use a package by bad actor, it is that if everyone using gazillion packages by known good authors, that makes all those known good authors with upload rights for their own packages into exploitable vulnerabilities for all the software that depends on their libraries. So far, this has mostly looked like someone stealing creds and sneakily uploading compromised versions, if the situation persists it will eventually get worse with organized crime attacking and using rubber hose cryptoanalysis on devs. There is too much value hanging on too wobbly a foundation here, the situation is not stable and it needs to change.
The C++ standard library is terrible because it was designed from nothing with no actual real-world testing. IMHO the best path forwards for Rust is that when crates become established and "complete" with little further development needed, they should eventually be merged into some large conglomerated library with an actual organization behind it. This doesn't necessarily need to be the standard library that ships with the language. Yes, this would end up like Python, where eventually there would be 4 http clients in there with 3 of them deprecated, but that would still be better than the present state of affairs.