Why the Brain Cannot Be a Computer
arxiv.org
arxiv.org
> Through systematic quantification of distinguishable conscious states and their historical dependencies, we establish that the minimum information required to specify a conscious state exceeds the physical information capacity of the human brain by a significant factor.
Distinguishable conscious states doesn't mean every historical record needs to be present and fully encoded.
It can, and very likely is, lossy - in fact, it certainly is very lossy. So the "calculated" "bit-length requirements for representing consciously distinguishable sensory "stimulus frames" are bogus.
While "Distinguishable experiences require distinguishable physical states" is a pretty basic and obviously true statement, the idea that we carry all of our historical experiences, and do it faithfully, is bullshit.
> "If conscious states necessarily incorporate their historical antecedents, then the minimum information required to specify any given conscious state must include information about all preceding states."
No, it just needs to carry SOME information about SOME preceding states, potentially lossy and heavily compressed.
For a simple math example, a neural network can be fed terrabytes of data, but the end result is just some weights that encode "memories", "features", "functions" etc in the data.
No it does not, however the mechanics of constructive and destructive potential is non-linear, allowing superior efficiency. The mind works more like a chemical reaction than a branch decision tree.
> It can, and very likely is, lossy - in fact, it certainly is very lossy.
Introspection prunes raw hyperdimensional memories into reinforced selective memories, loosing significant resolution in exchange for adapted value.
> the idea that we carry all of our historical experiences, and do it faithfully, is bullshit.
We carry a holographic rendering of every sensory experience, including internal awarenesses of every neurological cognition. Every cognition, even those one is never fully aware of.
These holographic details are only accessible in the raw by a rare few. All others have a “memory index” in a specialized part of the mind which maintains access to commonly available lower quality reinforced memories.
>> "If conscious states necessarily incorporate their historical antecedents, then the minimum information required to specify any given conscious state must include information about all preceding states."
> No, it just needs to carry SOME information about SOME preceding states, potentially lossy and heavily compressed.
A valid consideration for the sake of efficiency. Though consider your best ideas based on memories do not come in real time, or soon thereafter, rather after a great deal of time has passed, where latent details beyond immediate awareness have propagated and refactored.
especially with the "13 days ago" creation date
Love it or hate it, who else would say these things?
This is agreeable, despite objection to some other considerations as described.
> Through systematic quantification of distinguishable conscious states and their historical dependencies, we establish that the minimum information required to specify a conscious state exceeds the physical information capacity of the human brain by a significant factor.
Modern information theory is wrong. States are not the fundamental aspect of existential reality, nor of minds.
Potential resolving into state during evaluation are more accurate for both.
The mind, or conscious disposition is one of potential resolving through constructive and destructive interference into “state. Not of atomic “state.”
Any characterization of “mental state” or “conscious state” is a false contrivance of misunderstanding.
The very definition of information theory as described by “the possible number of states in a system” is wrong. A system may be described by potentials interfering, and the projected number of available states are boundary conditions, which may be exceeded or circumvented by unaccounted characteristics (those lacking during model formulation.)
> Our analysis calculates the bit-length requirements for representing consciously distinguishable sensory "stimulus frames" and demonstrates that consciousness exhibits mandatory temporal-historical dependencies that multiply these requirements beyond the brain's storage capabilities.
The brain is not composed of bit formulations. The brain stores “information” as analog holographic renderings, by which selective processing (learning and reinforcement) derive domain specific knowledge. This process is non-linear, as constructive and destructive interference behave as sieves. Rendered knowledge (conceptually equivalent to “states”) are a selective (and simplified) outcome.
> This mathematical approach offers new insights into the fundamental limitations of computational models of consciousness and suggests that non-classical information processing mechanisms may be necessary to account for conscious experience.
Consciousness, definable as the “inflection of the potential of existential being” does not have fundamental limits, rather there are capacity limitations of embodied. Consciousness is a quantum process (spare me the magic talk) which is holographic, not constrained by spin disposition, scaling by mass entanglement. Mass entanglement allows the analog information density to render by combined amplitude.
Additionally, consciousness is not conscious is not awareness. Awareness is the tips of consciousness, a temporal propagation. Conscious means “awake”. Consciousness is the biofeedback into the analog sieve of the neurologically bound quantum domain. The mind is of consciousness even when not conscious or aware.