I have far more epistemic humility than someone who thinks that consciousness arises out of the abstract form of a calculation rather than the physical substrate of a calculation. Believing that consciousness is tied to a specific physical substrate is on-its-face reasonable whereas believing that consciousness is tied to specific abstract forms is on-its-face unreasonable because to do so requires believing all kinds of absurd sequela.

I believe that a microprocessor is what it appears to be, that is, a microprocessor. That is the most epistemicly humble approach. You are rushing to ascribe personhood to a microprocessor with a certain kind of software running on it, or at the very least, saying that we can't rule personhood out. You are the one making the leap, not me.

Intelligence != consciousness, because believing that is so would require one to believe that the pain of a cognitively normal person is more real than the pain of someone with a developmental disability.

Also, I do not claim to have solved the hard problem of consciousness. Rather I have ruled out a particular answer, that is, the answer that consciousness arises from calculation in the abstract.