It's possible to come up with an "unnecessarily complex model" for why someone accused of a crime did the crime, but that has completely no bearing on whether the defendant is actually guilty. If the defendant is, in fact, innocent, then the prosecution's model is, in fact, untrue - no matter how well it fits the evidence.
Are you proposing that an explanation can be true even though there's a different explanation which better fits the evidence?
Or are we talking about cases where both candidate explanations fit the evidence equally, and you have access to some kind of intuition which tells you which of the two are true?
Such a proposition would be correct; compare the concept (and name!) of "overfitting" in statistics.
That’s another way of saying it’s untrue.
> Judge a model based on its accuracy, not its point of reference.
Something can be both accurate and wrong, in the manner of a model that pinpoints the cause of death from cancer as admission to a cancer ward.
Are you sure there will always be just one simplest theory? Or are you using some other criteria to pick it?
There's a basic principle called Ockham's Razor that I'm sure you're aware of, which proposes that the simplest theory is the most likely candidate, but that's a heuristic, not a rule.
Another relevant concept here is that the map is not the territory. All theories are attempts to express some kind of underlying truth via some sort of formal system. Some of those theories map much more closely to the truth than others, in a way that's independent of accurately predicting observed behavior to date.
All you have is the different theories, so there's no definitive way to assess their closeness to truth other than by their predictive accuracy. If you don't have the physical capacity to leave the room and observe the world, all you've got is the maps themselves and how well they predict travel times and features found along the way.
The only tool you have is the inductive strength of a big pile of observations in which correlations emerge. You can do experiments to prune certain causal stories, but there's never time to eliminate all possible stories. You end up with something that makes sense for you, in terms of the equipment that you have, and the theories that you and your peers use, and it's good enough, so we move forward with it.
I can see how it might be useful to document a particular explanation as "the" explanation, especially if you're communicating why a drug works because it will lead to useful conclusions about who should or shouldn't take the drug.
But when it comes to speculation about whether a given astronomical body will be visible at a particular time, I think science would have progressed much more quickly if we had not held so tightly to the notion that one explanation is intrinsically correct, and we're probably holding ourselves back now in other domains by doing the same.