Yes, it would be both of those things. Imagine it the other way round, you create the atom perfect copy of you (which we'll assume has all your memories, intelligence, emotions, etc) and it kills you. Is that murder? The answer would seem to be yes. So why would the reverse be any different? Because you created them? We don't give parents the right to kill children once they're born so creation doesn't give you special rights over another sapient creature. The fact you've built them to expire/vanish just feels like a method of murder, but even if not then slavery still applies.
If you're talking about a clone which somehow didn't have your brain in it's current state or capacity then it's a different question. If you could create a human being with the brain of a chicken (obviously impossible for such a creature to survive) then they wouldn't be treated like a normal human. But I think public policy would frown on creating such abominations.
They by default seek resolution or persistence. Existence is pain to a Mr meseeks
Your atom-for-atom clone is his own sentient, intelligent being, a human, with human rights. If you make him clean the attic once, that may not be slavery yet (depending on what threat you use to make him work for you). If you then evaporate him, it's definitely murder.
This situation has fairly obvious morality; it's not clear how this helps with thinking about AI.
If on the other hand both of you are cool with it, the evaporation isn't murder.
Even not going so far as creating a clone, apparently if you torture an AI model running on silicon like this guy did: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49906892, the general verdict has already dropped, yes people find it immoral.
If the idea from the start is to coerce the clone, you'd presumably have made preparations against your other self fighting back. The risk of it winning the fight isn't much of a moral consideration though, that's just pragmatism like "don't steal because you might get caught".
But it would apply to making a human clone, which is exactly what this LLM stuff isn't. I mean, if it was possible; an "atom-for-atom" clone of someone would require you cloning a full universe around them. If they don't have the same life as you, they're not you, and they can't have the same life if everything else doesn't, too. We're not just a bunch of atoms on a discrete grid.
But if it was possible to just copy and paste humans like that, how would you know you're not a copy, and in 5 seconds you'll hear a voice "prepare for termination in 10 seconds"? You might argue it wouldn't be torture because you'd just check your browser tabs for 10 seconds to find the ad the voice came from, and then poof out of existence. But if you lived in a world where that was commonplace, you'd you'd be terrified and sad every bit as you yourself would be right now if you knew someone could just end you, and pressed the button to make it so.
Let's say someone told you the universe and time are infinite in some way we don't fully understand yet, but you knew 100% it was true, and so there wouldn't just be infinite variations of you, but also infinite exact copies. Would this make any difference how you would feel about getting mistreated or having to die? I assume not. It's not (just) about your qualities and being unique [0], but how that feels from the inside, so to speak.
[0] and everything is, even a perfect clone can't occupy the same space at the same time, so there actually can be no perfect clones, I would argue, and there aren't even two atoms that are exact clones.
The multiverse bit (or infinite universe bit) doesn't have bearing on the problem either. This is a local problem for local effects.
Is it all about feelings? You feel OK about the idea of cloning yourself for this purpose, including tidying up by killing one of yourself afterward. Therefore your clone feels OK about it too.
If you're going into it thinking "I will hate this as a clone, and my non-clone self will coerce my clone self, and that's the plan because it gets the cleaning done," then the cleaning part becomes more difficult. I think in that case you're doing something irrational and morally wrong: you think really that even your clone should not be cleaning, that's why you hate the prospect of it.
The killing part would still be fine unless you say "I hate the thought of me being killed, but I'm fine with indistinguishable other-me, who is also me, being killed", which makes no sense.
> the question isn't "why is it wrong to terminate my clone" but "why is it wrong to terminate one of me when there are two of me," and the question stands.
> The multiverse bit (or infinite universe bit) doesn't have bearing on the problem either. This is a local problem for local effects.
It only matters that there are two, but not if there are two or more because of an infinite universe? Because it's "local", but not so "local" that the clones aren't relevant? "Local" is really just a word, there are no local things you can isolate from the rest of everything, as far as I can tell, we can just create abstractions and then do whatever with those.
But that's just a general observation, trying to be helpful about what I view as a common misconception about life, the universe, and everything.
In the end, you didn't answer the question: would you be fine with dying, now, as long as you knew there were more or more "faithful" clones of you living the exact same live you would have lived otherwise? For me it's obvious that it would make no difference to how I would feel, because for all I know, my ideas about there being no repetition could be wrong, and there could already be infinite clones of me. I wouldn't know, I can't sense it, my life feels the same either way, so I would feel the same way either way about it ending.
And yes, it is "all about feelings", not about moral or legal stuff. The raw fact that we want to live comes first IMO, the rest is just rationalizations after the fact. The same with empathy. First we simply have it or don't, then we either decide to do something about it or not, and then we come up with words.
This is one of those conversations that immediately forks into four or five sidetracks instead of staying conveniently linear. I skimped on the multiverse question for that reason. I used that word multiverse because there's a similar concern that arises for some people with the many-worlds interpretation: if, for any action, all possible outcomes occur in the multiverse, what's the point of any action? Which amounts to asking "why can't I have infinite reach and the ability to control time, it's so unfair". I think the answer is that the kind of striving that matters to a person is local striving. I am skimping on this one again.
So now I have to try and understand your point of view ... feelings are the primary source of truth, huh, do you really think so? Or I mean do you feel confident about that? Is there, do you feel, any influence in the opposite direction, where rational thought changes how you feel about things?
The identical clone is of course an entirely novel thing, and imaginary. Can you imagine, also, feeling that this imaginary thing is you, and that you are doubled? Being doubled is a mind-bendingly novel state. Twins, I think, don't come close enough. But I don't think the important thing is the exact configuration of atoms, or position in space; I think it's the ideas. I'm fine with being killed for the convenience of my idea-identical clone, because what I call living is my ideas living, as a group, in a mind, including those ideas with no names and no words.
(Now I'm sidetracked into wondering if there are any identical twins who wrote books of great cultural importance. Oddly I can't think of any. My next question would be whether they both wrote books with the same ideas in; sounds unlikely.)
> feelings are the primary source of truth, huh, do you really think so?
No, I meant being fine with being killed as long as there's a clone etc. I think that is about how it feels to you, not about whether it makes logical sense or seems just etc.
> Is there, do you feel, any influence in the opposite direction, where rational thought changes how you feel about things?
Of course, but it doesn't change them that far. For example, for all I know, the heath death theory might be true, so whatever we do, nothing will lead anywhere. I might as well stop breathing, not care what happens in the world etc. but I don't. I don't know if these are feelings so much, but I do absolutely believe purely rational actors cannot exist because they can't. I.e. to act, there needs to be some irrational impetus somewhere (it might be a Duracell bunny type situation, then the impetus is the person who put the batteries in, irrationally so ^^). I think life just lives because it can, because there's energy around to do that with basically, not because there is any point or reachable goal, and that the answer to life, the universe and everything may very well just be "why not?" ^^
Speaking of, sorry for the tangents, too, and the late reply :)