I wonder if the incremental efficiency gains from this outweigh the damages. That doesn't even sound like a bad idea, unless of course nobody stops to think "but what if someone hacks this".
I wonder if the incremental efficiency gains from this outweigh the damages. That doesn't even sound like a bad idea, unless of course nobody stops to think "but what if someone hacks this".
Connectivity in these environments is often challenging, it isn't like connecting a consumer fridge to wifi. Sometimes you are bridging weird networks that multiple parties need access to. It should be secure but that isn't as straightforward as one might assume. Many of these systems have very long lives, so there are many limitations that reflect the technology that existed when they were built.
All of this is invisible to the average person but it is what makes the world work.
Yes, a lot of it exists to squeeze a bit more of a margin out of the business, but come on. The alternative isn't going back to the Middle Ages, it's shaving 0.1% off the profit margin. It's OK to wonder if the risk is worth it.
But more to the point, there's plenty of grocery stores that ask 20% more than their competitors and are doing just fine; in fact, constant price changes and promotions make it impossible for consumers to really compare if Safeway is cheaper than Whole Foods, so people usually go to the place that's physically closer, has better selection, or better vibes. I can't even know if a 12-pack of Coca-Cola is going to be $6.99 or $9.99 today.
You must not mean what you have said here. If so, you are double-dipping.
Which apparently why after >2000yrs of effort from both sides we now, finally!, have locks that no lockpicker can compromise.
Vulnerabilities will always exist. Systems will always be hackable. You solve the problem by patching what you can, and cleaning up after what gets exploited, if and when it gets exploited.
If only…
The increased profits that have occurred in recent decades have landed with the big food companies, not with the retail chains selling their products at very little margin.
They did promise to increase the cost of breakfast a couple years ago.
AKA, the decade where everyone bought way too much into the 'Just do JIT supply chain for the manufacturing location to warehouse tail and pretend we are Amazon' bullshit.
I put it that way because it is short-sighted to not consider that transportation costs will always increase over time (i.e. fuel prices, wages of drivers) and shipping a final product over that long of a distance (i.e. at least half of the country, and instead of shipping grain to process it is finished boxes which is less efficient for volume) and yet they made that choice.
Where it got nasty is that when the average consumer base decided it was fine to pay dealer markups on cars because of the parts issues that industry saw from their JIT shortsights, everyone saw dollar signs instead of a problem to fix.
I did go ahead and do a query against gemini, and the estimate is 25 cents a box after considering long tail expenses (i.e. fuel, CARB premiums, etc.)
So, Less than you thought and way less than even I initially expected.
Mea culpa on my end, I wonder where the other parts of the price are coming from.
I do have other thoughts, but don't know California labor laws and the like enough to guess.
e.x. I know one big factor in the 'slowing' of inflation of grocery prices in my state over the last 20 years, has been the erosion of pay/benefits for workers. If California is still guaranteeing that for the workers (decent health care, at least a couple weeks of vacation time, etc.) and it's built into the cost... makes sense and TBH I wouldn't hate paying extra for that. Grocers here have with only a few exceptions gotten terrible.
I would be interested to know what the damage caused by this attack is compared to savings over a system where thermostats need to be adjusted on-site.
Or "Your reefer is set to 35 degrees but you're hauling chilled beer, we set it to 40 degrees to save fuel"
Maybe we throw it all away and go to 1990s-style grocery chain management, hire a bunch of people, and costs go up while reliability and monitoring shifts to humans. But that doesn't mesh with consumer expectations on price, which is probably how the whole system originated.
Further, once you have hundreds or thousands of devices, “just call someone to turn it up/down/off” doesn’t scale.
And yet, somehow it did scale just fine for a hundred years before we hooked everything up to the internet.
You need to save labor somewhere to free it up for other jobs that give you technological progress. If everyone would still be occupied plowing fields with oxen, we wouldn’t have cars and computers now.
I think the entire supply chain is making sure it has maximum profits extractable by law and any other emergent phenomena you observe is serendipitous and probably temporary, damaged or dropped as soon as the regulatory environment or marketplace changes to allow another dime of profit.
Of course in a cynical view companies only try to "generate profit" but usually generating profit is tied to providing some sort of service or product, and people like to buy good products
The perspective of resiliency and how much will you lose if things go wrong seems kinda… new?
Funny that it should happen in France which has been at the forefront of European self resilience.
The biggest issue is that many of these IoT devices are badly secured. I spent years trying to convince people to build more secure IoT systems, but they always preferred cheap and easy solutions.
For me this has always been true of systems in general all across the decades that I've worked with technology. It's like pulling teeth to convince anyone in charge that backups or security are even a little bit important until after there's been a costly disaster, then it's all about "Why didn't you warn me this could happen?" - Umm... You mean like every single day for many months until you told me to shut up about it because my paranoia doesn't justify the tiny expense of ensuring you don't lose many tens of thousands of dollars or years of irreplaceable work or important records?
https://www.danfoss.com/en/service-and-support/fix-and-troub...
They highlight connection through a firewall, mention secure remote access methods, monitoring for data breaches, strong access controls, etc. Reasonable, but these are just recommendations, so the stores could have followed all of them or none at all.
An article about Danfoss vulnerabilities mentioned in a different comment (https://claroty.com/team82/research/freeze-the-controller-de...) says
> we searched publicly available internet-wide scanning platforms, including Shodan and Censys, for signatures associated with its management interface. It didn't take long to find what we were looking for. Numerous controllers [2765] were directly accessible from the public Internet.
So none at all is a possibility.
... And then the customer demands it be turned off, and the customer is always right...
Though I'm afraid things are getting worse, or at least it looked so a few years ago, back when I worked in this space. The hot thing in IIoT / Industry 4.0 was basically taking all webshit technologies and deploying them on industrial hardware, to "leverage mature innovation and OSS ecosystem" or such nonsense. The problem (one of many) being, once the engineers were done trimming excessive security measures that negatively impacted safety, they were still left with node.js running on industrial controllers, now even less secure in general than it was originally.
Did you know that buildings have doors that cannot be locked to prevent them from being opened from inside, because otherwise in case of a fire (or in the US, active shooter), people will die if they cannot exit the building?
Did you know that many industrial plants intentionally disable certificate revocation checks, because having a certificate expire on you for whatever reason is a sure-fire way to break the plant (and in some case possibly kill people), and overall a nuisance when trying to keep the plant running, while the threat it protects against can be handled elsewhere in the stack?
Security and safety are very often at odds - not just in emergency, but during regular operations.
So you can find one, log in, and have a look for yourself.
You shouldn't.
But you can.
But you shouldn't. Okay? Don't.
I have been in meetings were the Data Security Officer refused to sign off on specific projects, without having a proper pentesting report in place, for example.
Because legally it would be their responsibility, if something would happen.
For the latter I would imagine you could have a short (maybe a month) logging period where you connect the fridges and collect data and then comeup with some offline system to manage them generally for better efficiency. You could even have a test group or single fridge that you keep connected to the internet for future data points (like in case of a giant heatwave or something)
So we spill cold air on the floor and heat the place with AC, then talk about low margins and having to save energy costs. Does anyone see the issue?
> how it affects customer purchase decisions.
If nobody wastes energy in a stupid way like this, what changes? Are they no longer buying cold things? So what, then you sell more of the stuff that doesn't need refrigeration.
If there were two identical supermarkets, and one had running taps, and the other turned off their taps after using them, and paid their employes 5cents more a month, I would shop in the second one. But I can't, I don't get the choice, because a bunch of bunch of marketing people convinced someone to get an "edge" over the competition, and then told everybody else they have to, too, or they'll FaLL BeHiND.
Did everyone forget about Therac-25?
Lets combine some testy topics: will LLMs make this any better? On the one hand, if it's easy for fridge manufacturers to churn out code, will the slop create enough cracks in the icemaker to sail the titanic through? Or will the lower barrier to pretty good security agents get more security into the IoT field (assuming it's taken advantage of?) Or will it not matter because the store manager will just set the web portal password to 123456?
- Cheapest possible test-passing AI generated code with minimal check-box style security audit.
- Looser and broader definitions and greater penalties for hacking.
Anything you might want to change with a freezer already requires someone physically there. It's like making a socket ratchet have a remote controlled direction toggle. Or a remote control button to light the inside of your money box on fire.
If you home refrigerator could be defrosted remotely, in what scenario would you ever do that?
Every now and then our customers ask if we can add remote control for specific parameters but we've always turned them down, citing liability reasons.
Re: legacy Danfoss systems such as AKM, 720 and 850 there is no way to have read-only access (for different reasons in each case). I haven't been able to find weaknesses in the new 800A yet, but that's only because I have not had to try yet.
The article is dated August 2026. Synacktiv (a different company) reported the very same vulnerability for older system managers/controllers already in 2023. Their report[1] says Danfoss told the products are EOL and should be upgraded. At no point did Danfoss fix the same issue in 800A. Typical.
Back in 2016 when we were integrating their 850 series system managers we encountered an issue with the HTTP API returning 400 series errors over slow links. We sent them PoC code written in Python 3. One month later they sent us an email, complaining that they first had to backport the PoC code to Python 2.7 as that was the newest version they could install. They also attached a "fixed" PoC code snipped where they had removed the artificial delays that did not trigger the issue. Danfoss never did anything to actively fix the issue.
One year later I browsed changelogs for the commercial RTOS that Danfoss used and realized the issue was fixed upstream in 2010 or 2011. That means their AK-SM 850 had at least six years worth of unfixed bugs.
[1] https://www.synacktiv.com/sites/default/files/2023-10/synack... (despite saying SM800, the firmware in question is for AK-SM 850)
Edit: The parent commenter seems to work at Danfoss on their Leanheat platform.
I worked with district heating, no idea what the cooling guys are/were doing. It's a big company.