> Passkeys should never be allowed to be exported in clear text.
and from another comment by the issue creator:
> I don't quite understand why requiring file protection/encryption can't be a temporary minimum bar here.
They're arguing for storing them in encrypted form. That's very much a different argument than arguing against exporting. I'm not taking any sides here, I just think it's bad to so badly misrepresent people's standpoints.
Such security, very rules, wow.
Because an ZIP file with the encrypted key and the password to it in plain text is sooooo much more secure (but it doesn't break the rules, right?).
The complaint wasn't in allowing credentials to move (that is the point of the CXF and CXP work). The complaint was in having sensitive data in a plaintext file live long-term without any protections. That is also why one of Tim's early recommendations was to require encrypting the file via a passphrase.
Ultimately if a user wants control over their own keys so they can have a failsafe for recovery (and handle the safety of those exports themselves) they should be able to do so. Until we have very safe mechanisms for backups of passkeys we'll never be able to truly disable other very insecure forms of account recovery without too much risk.
[Passkeys] should never be exported in clear text
Overview
Passkeys should never be allowed to be exported in clear text.
[...]
I suppose we have different interpretations of the headline.