I'm still glad that it existed as its mere existence seems to have pushed things in the right direction as far as protecting everyone's ability to use encryption if they chose. It just never became the panacea it was envisioned to be.
I'm still glad that it existed as its mere existence seems to have pushed things in the right direction as far as protecting everyone's ability to use encryption if they chose. It just never became the panacea it was envisioned to be.
Dunno that things have gotten much better over the years. End to end encryption is still fairly unusable to most. I think that rather than spending so much time on the cryptography we should instead work on a E2EE usability standard. Having everyone doing their own thing with respect to usability is not working out.
It provides the tools necessary to implement a simpler workflow.
You can send password protected mails that the recipient can read in the browser given a pre-shared password. https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails
Mind. Blown.
It was pretty awkward to later emerge as the PGP expert at work. I was at that time a bit shy about explaining how I got so comfortable with it.
Otherwise, anyone who is using it at all will get court ordered and then, with our current system, you just lose.
Tor solves this by making traffic entirely homogenous such that any "it could be anyone" and by making nodes extraordinarily easy to host (such that any nerd can just leave one running 24/7). Even so there are way too few nodes.
But PGP-over-email is way too metadata leaky, and if you're doing anything that actually has a threat model, you need PGP-over-email to be itself common.
Thus, participants are pooled under 1 time constrained key exchange, participants sections origins are signed/time-stamped, and the ciphertext expires on a schedule.
Why? so at some future time side-channel key exfiltration can't be used to data mine the entire history of past tapped conversations/ciphertext. Even if a private signing key is stolen, it is difficult to rebuild the lost ephemeral key session.
Have a nice day. =3
Depends what you do, and if your organization has a persistent clown infestation. Some big business folks still use email as a human to API interface.
Running out-of-band public keychains is not something most people will ever need. =3
Your wording is not entirely accurate.
ProtonMail works perfectly well with external PGP. You can import third-party keys and IIRC it also supports WKD.
So its not "only another ProtonMail user".
IN ADDITION .... you can also send an encrypted, password protected message to a non-Proton Mail email address. The recipient can read it in the browser: https://proton.me/support/password-protected-emails
Anything+PGP can be encrypted. You still have to use PGP which means creating public/private key pairs, store them correctly, and understand when to use the public key and when to use the private key. You still then need to know how to exchange keys in a trustworthy manner, but that's after you convince someone else to do all of that on their end as well.
So yeah, it's dead simple <facepalm>
This could allow a single technical user with an elaborate PGP key and email setup to convince his or her social circle (or at least email circle) to switch to Protonmail and follow a set of (comparatively) simple steps to get Proton to recognize the key to their non-Proton address.
Thereby having PGP-encrypted conversations with users who don't know how PGP works, but followed their friends' instructions to use a slightly different webmail interface. Meanwhile the technical user can use a smartcard, a self-hosted email server, or other madness that a normal user would never tolerate.
There is AFAIK only one other email service that offers a similar level of functionality, and that is Mailbox.org.
However the proton UI/UX experience for importing and managing keys is much better for the non-technical user in Proton. The UI/UX in Mailbox.org is messy.
"GMail+PGP or AOL+PGP or FastMail+PGP or $coolNameMail+PGP" is not the same thing and I hope the GP who replied to me knows that full well. ;)
The correct operation for (even locally) marking "this key belongs to person X" is signing the key. Marking it as "trusted" indicates "this key is a CA that can create statements who other keys belong to", but it's easier to find/"understand".
So if you haven't first studied the details of the security model and terminology, you just start increasing the trust level on the key of your communication partner until the warnings go away, not realizing that by doing this, you've made that key a CA and the reason the warnings disappeared is because you now trust the self-signature (in addition to all other signatures the key issued).
If we assume that the threshold of what is "difficult" is for example 1) installing a desktop application, or even running a deskop OS.
2) Running an email provider other than what you are already doing (gmail, hotmail, yahoo mail, ...), or switching email providers
3) Copying and pasting text or using files.
This was perhaps a viable thing to do for users in 2005 because if you were on the internet, chances are you at least had a desktop computer, and if you used email chances are you already had to struggle with an email client.
But now? Anything that isn't as easy as installing an app on your device (a device that isn't a full computer) is "difficult".
It's not that it's harder today, it's that everything else is easier (Like telegram/signal and other privacy-minded services), and that there are now 6 billion internet users and most never used a computer and never will.
I don't see how. You just type "gpg -e -r receipient@domain.com filename.txt". It doesn't get much simpler than that. It's not like you are using ffmpeg, imagemagick, or other programs with a hundred switches in it.
Also PGP/GnuPG is not only for email. I encrypt and decrypt hundreds and hundreds of payloads per day, programmatically between trusted and untrusted networks.
And it is mandatory for each employee to upload their public key to our keystore so that we can deliver private information to them securely over Slack, Teams, or other communication channels.
I assure you it is not that simple. For example, I'm a HN user, developer since 30 years. I know that you referred to what's known as a "terminal" or "shell" here, but that's already way WAY too difficult for 99.9% of users.
And even in my terminal I can assure you it won't work: "'gpg' is not recognized as an internal or external command, operable program or batch file."
I could install it. It would be a right pain though. and it doesn't help if the recipient of my email can't install it without me sending a long list of instructions!
Meanwhile my dad had zero problems installing signal. There's a difference to how easy it gets.
The problem was only one other person I knew actually used it, it didn't really have a justifiable use for most people.
I did use the encrypted mountable drives for a while, that worked very well. I since moved to TrueCrypt and now onto Vercrypt and haven't used a PGP product for probably over 15 years.
Shame really but it just didn't get enough traction.