What about it?
Reporting on declassified history says the NSA pushed for a shorter DES key; the compromise was 56 bits
NSA and a suspected cryptographic backdoor: the Dual_EC_DRBG random-number generator was the subject of reporting about an NSA backdoor and an alleged payment to RSA. RSA denied knowingly weakening its products.
TLS 1.0’s CBC chaining made IVs predictable and enabled the BEAST attack. That’s a documented protocol weakness, allegedly put in there by US state actors on purpose.
This is errant nonsense. At the time SSL/TLS were designed, using CBC with block ciphers was generally considered best practice - it was not at all an unusual choice.
The US government had no need to corrupt IPSEC standardization. The IETF did the work for them without prompting.
You have far more to fear from standards bodies just acting like standards bodies (limited recent exceptions notwithstanding) than from government interference with standards. Like I said, all NSA usually needs to do is sit back and wait for standards groups to come up with Heartbleed on their own.
Quoting something implies that it has certain authority (like a crypto expert) and the correctness track record of AI generated text is obviously shaky.
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