I'd appreciate some references. That's not because I'm trying to put you down with a request for references, but clearly you have seen them, and I'd like to see them.
Also, you still have to convince the public.
Also, you still have to convince the public.
There have also been earlier implementations like this one: https://github.com/benadida/helios (corresponding paper https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/sec08/tech/full_papers/a...), although it still lacked coercion resistance. But it already uses zero knowledge proofs, which is at the core of anonymous yet verifiable systems.
It is never as simple as just some paper ballots. But we have a bigger problem. It's a problem at scale. We have all those issues because we do not have enough experts to run all the voting locations at once. The observers need to understand the rules and their rights. The official needs to do so, too. The work of an expert is not scalable, because he cannot be at all places at once.
However, an expert who audits the software is very scalable. One expert can find issues everywhere.
Or because they do.
That is not true. Or at least there are no known attack vectors. Modern privacy coins would not work otherwise.
See also a summary on how it works here: https://vocdoni.io/en/blog/davinci-paper-zisk-sequencer
We've been working on this protocol for the last years, and we do believe it solves or at least highly mitigates most of the current e-voting issues.
Nonetheless, quantum computing attacks are a new thread to also consider. But solutions to it might exist in the near future.
In terms of working democracy and social governance, we can kill a big flock of birds with a single shot if the public can understand cryptography. Think about it: we live in an age where everything is digital and has a microprocessor inside. Even money is digital. But the "public" can't parse simple logical statements, and they vote for the funniest clown in the race (for a definition of funny). The best this schism can possibly end is if we vote in a Luddite Empire that squashes technology. All other scenarios are far scarier.
For the system to be credible and resilient against coups it must be possible for the average person to audit the system end-to-end. This is impossible to achieve with online voting, yet trivially achievable with paper ballot systems:
An observer can verify that ID is being verified, that voter list is managed correctly, that every person is issued 1 ballot.
When votes are being counted they can see each ballot and count along with the officials. The number of ballots in the box must match the number of issued ballots based on the voter list.
They can get a copy of the report where they verify that the counts are correct. Then they can verify that the authorities indeed used the same numbers for their polling place in the final counts. And because you have cooperating like-minded observers in every polling place, you know that the final count is correct.
It's like a human-powered Merkle tree.