> This means that they have the same restrictions as other user-installed apps.
This isn't meaningful when the other user-installed apps are calling Google Play Services in the same sandbox.
This isn't meaningful when the other user-installed apps are calling Google Play Services in the same sandbox.
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App & mini Google Play Services = access is restricted, like other regular apps.
App & mini Google Play Services + Sandboxed Google Play (unprivileged) = virtually the same access as above
App & mini Google Play Services + microG (privileged) = Google has the same access as the situations above, but with worse app compatibility, worse security (especially because of privileged access), and worse privacy (leaks).
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You're worried about apps without special permissions to anything sharing usage data that they have access to anyway while ignoring the huge problems with microG just because "Google bad". That's hardly a sane approach to privacy.
GrapheneOS gives drastically less access to closed source Google Play code including the SDK, libraries and droidguard than the microG approach on /e/. It's strictly less, not more in any way. GrapheneOS does not allow it to access anything not already accessible to the SDK and libraries in the apps using those.
This Google service functionality also doesn't come as part of GrapheneOS. GrapheneOS has network location, geocoding and other functionality included in the OS via standalone implementations not tied to Google service compatibility as they are with microG.
GrapheneOS does reimplement the Google Play location service, but it does so inside of apps using it as a library to avoid needing a new service with location access and other privileges. It uses the OS network location when enabled but the OS network location is entirely independent from it.