> The other two certificates are for codesigning and trusted by Microsoft
That seems like a WAY bigger problem than TLS, but AFAIK Windows still validates code signing certs against CRLs before trusting them (can't remember if it soft-fails).
That seems like a WAY bigger problem than TLS, but AFAIK Windows still validates code signing certs against CRLs before trusting them (can't remember if it soft-fails).
This is absolutely false, it's a simple policy change to enforce code signing, any organization that is serious about security can do it.
I'll give you the benefit of the doubt and assume you're another Linux guy who doesn't understand Windows security.
The concern of course is with malware being signed, which is far more likely to be abused than some TLS MITM fantasy.
You already need compromised systems to install malware, signed or not. Not a real problem.
For TLS MitM you just need to use a shared network, wired or wireless.
Is this true? Ads pointing to a malicious Notepad++ is already an existing thing. Now their malicious version will pass signing checks. Users will happily install these without the system itself being compromised.