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Comment by Toutouxc | Hacker News Reader

Somehow this is making it even worse. Like, I'm having issues explaining the whole thing to my wife, because I can't come up with a metaphor or parable that's even remotely as ridiculous as what they've done. Anyone's got a good one?

Maybe, like, setting up a factory that builds both LHD and RHD cars and building cars with two passenger seats in the front for two years straight without anyone noticing?

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The internet's security relies on an almost impenetrable wall built around it. The king appoints gatekeepers that are each entrusted with a gate they must protect. The gatekeepers must follow a rigorous interrogation process to verify the ID of anyone who wants to pass through their gate. Only then are they permitted to unlock it.

The king was very careful to ensure all the gatekeepers were following the process correctly. It did not occur to anybody that one of the gatekeepers could be using a dirty rag to jam their gate closed instead of a lock.

Once discovered, the wall could be trivially bypassed. The security of the whole internet was immediately broken. Rebuilding the wall to block up the dodgy gate took much effort from very many people.

Now the gatekeeper is saying "I don't want to be a gatekeeper anymore for this one particular gate, because people were mean to me. I'll however continue being gatekeeper for these other gates that drive my business either way."

In this analogy I think it would be more appropriate to call them a lockmaker, and a lot of gates have been using this lock. Finding and fixing every lock is where the effort comes from, and some locks may not be found for years to come.

This lockmaker analogy fails to capture one critical aspect: the failure of one CA breaks the security of everyone, even if they did not use that CA's "locks".

This is why I went for a "wall with many gates" instead; any bypass makes all gates redundant.

All analogies break down at some level; the main goal is to clearly communicate the most important ideas.

I think a part of the issue was, everyone living outside the walls did not even try to kick the gates open as everyone assumed a big (cryptographically secure) lock was being used by all gatekeepers.

Its called a Potemkin solution, and there is a serious theory that most nuclear arsenals are exactly that: no-one has ever confirmed they can actually be fired.

In the case of nuclear arsenals that's perfectly fine - MAD simply needs to be plausible, not robustly demonstrated. In the case of CAs I'd argue that the description doesn't really fit since they're getting stress tested by malicious parties on a daily basis. By that logic you could describe linux kernel security as a potemkin village due to the steady stream of zero days. In reality a potemkin village is something intended from the start to deceive everyone else. It's not impossible that's what happened here but that's a very serious allegation to make (ie theorizing that the weak keys were intentional with a conspiracy afoot).

Based on everything with the NSA and backdoors etc, the idea that this was intentional is not inherently implausible.

The reason I agree with you is that it was too obvious i.e. if you were backdoooring something, you would want it to be more difficult to detect than this.

I guess the main takeaway is that the entire Web PKI is a far bigger house of cards than everyone assumes. Ignorance is bliss, I guess.

> no-one has ever confirmed they can actually be fired

that is untrue

https://drmaciver.com/2022/05/learning-to-walk-through-walls...

Citing Terry Pratchett’s “Interesting Times”.

I think part of the issue is that we allow gatekeepers to open any gate.

This system was invented in the 90s when things were looking up. China was opening up to the world, the Russians were suddenly not evil anymore, and the internet was supposed to bring us all together into one happy global society, kumbaya and all that. Obviously that didn't work out.

It's time for a rethink really. Every CA is now a single point of failure.

The entire system (CAs and ICANN DNS) was never good to begin with; it's just become that much worse due to the shifting situation over the years. It's an inherently centralized design with no way to verify that example.com is operated by the same entity from one day to the next. The namespace is global and effectively an exercise in rent seeking.

At absolute minimum any sensible system would have a TOFU element whereby the site operator of example.com changing from one day to the next would result in all the tooling across the entire stack screaming loudly (in other words what ssh does). And that's just the absolute bare minimum change that's needed.

We do at least have CAA records that you can use to tell clients to only accept TLS certificates from specific CAs for your hostnames, but ideally that would be opt-out rather than opt-in.

In the old days a king would "sign" his proclamations by pressing his "unforgeable" signet into a wax seal. This proved the authenticity of the proclamation.

Normally, the king would declare and sign a proc stating that anything signed by his secretary's "unforgeable" signet was to be respected as well. The secretary could delegate authority to others in turn.

Well turns out that one of the signets in the chain of trust was just a picture of a "four" that anybody could have forged, but nobody noticed because in all of the ceremony and stacks of parchment with wax seals, nobody actually checked if the signet was secure.

The signets were "unforgeable" in that the penalty for copying one was death by being tortured, hanged, drawn and quartered.

They were "unforgeable" because commissioning a jeweler to make an intricate carving on a ring by hand was very expensive in the first place. Finding one who could precisely replicate an existing carving, down to the mistakes of its original author and any wear and tear that would be visible on the wax seal, was almost impossible and even more expensive.

Of course, I didn't mean to imply it took zero effort to copy one, though I guess that's how it read. You'd have to find a skilled jeweler that's also willing to commit treason, so for sure the barrier wasn't insignificant there.

Indeed. In both this scenario and our modern one, we rely on the difficulty of "key material" reproduction being greater than the difficulty of its creation.

That would be retroactive security...

However, Kings likely benefitted from the option of a scapegoat, they could always blame someone for forging their unforgeable seal and have them killed, rather than admit that the seal was true.

If we add in attainder and escheat, the King had a pretty strong hand.

Bravo

"the king has no cryptographically strong certificate"

It's enough that the signet could be verified, and sometimes was [1].

As it turns out, these documents were mostly useful for long-lived décisions, which could be overturned, and where a forgery exposed you for a lifetime.

[1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_III_of_Artois#The_fraud...

https://bsky.app/profile/anthonymoser.com/post/3myf5fwpl7s2t is a good explainer I think without getting into the nitty gritty details.

  for the non technical folks:  imagine there was a password that if you guess   it, you can impersonate *any website on the internet*
  
  now imagine the password is literally the number 4

This seems like the easiest way to frame it to non-technical people to me. They know what passwords are.

I just explained what it actually is. I said "you know how you go to a website HTTPS and it's secure? Well Apple chose a couple of trusted parties that your phone inherently trusts, and those people approve a few thousand intermediate companies who do the day-to-day certificate work for end websites. One of those intermediates, rather than choosing a 200-digit random number, chose 4, no not four-digits, the number 4". And then we could laugh at some of the memes.

Our 200 digit random number was 199 zeroes followed by a 4

- emudhra lawyer maybe (:

technically possible

Not just technically possible, as likely as getting any other random 116(?) digit number

Feynman's license plate

i think this oversells the likelihood of it. the probability of any random 116 digit number having its first 115 digits be the number zero is much lower than that of it containing a much higher number of non-zero digits.

Private key size is 384 bits or 116 decimal digits. So 115 zeroes.

You mean, the key was 383 zeros and one “one”, on the third place from the right :)

I really wonder if this would/should hold in court. It is ridiculously unlikely yet genuinely possible.

One of them, sure. 8 of them?

At this point we're talking about chances so slim that only philosophy can save the situation.

It's hard to explain partly because when you explain this thing we've done with TLS and PKI, it sounds a little insane.

> "We set up a system where every government and a bunch of random banks and IT companies in the world holds the secret codes to everyone's encryption. Then we make them pinky swear not to abuse it, with stern talkings to if they do. And now it's all on fire, because one of them was irresponsible!"

You can know the intractability of the problem that PKI is solving, and the (worse) alternatives that have been tried, but that doesn't make this system not-insane to a normal person, and its at least a little bit the fault of the collective "us".

And it's not like it is an impossible problem; we rely on TOFU for SSH, we have remotely-attestable TPMs everywhere, ZKPPs / PAKEs exist, session keys and federation protocols are widespread. Somewhere in the set of "possible solutions" are options that don't sound unhinged when you explain how we got to this eMuhdra situation.

I believe you misunderstood how it works. A parent certificate cannot be used to decrypt information encrypted by a child certificate… the CA issuer just signs your child certificate, it doesn’t have access to your private key.

Then, everyone who trusts the CA will trust your certificate by checking it is signed by the CA who should have done the checks to ensure your certificate contains truthful data.

So your layman description of “they have secret codes to everyone’s encryption” is completely wrong.

Certificate keys aren't used for encryption anymore anyway.

A modern TLS connection uses an ephemeral key-exchange protocol where both parties opaquely agree to a one-time-use random encryption key that is not knowable to any other party, not even someone who can gain access to either party's private key. This is called Forward Secrecy (originally and sometimes still known as Perfect Forward Secrecy or PFS, but the use of the word "perfect" in any cryptographic context is akin to naming a ship "Unsinkable").

Right, thanks for correcting me. This stuff is not so simple to get right.

They have the secret codes to MITM (intercept, inspect, alter and forge) any communication if they manage to place themselves between you and a party you trust.

Ok, but the analogy was wrong anyway.

> random banks and IT companies in the world holds the secret codes to everyone's encryption.

That's not true at all.

What they do have is the power to MITM connections IF they first spook DNS or insert themselves into a proxy accepted by the server somehow.

So, if you want to be honest, the original sentence becomes:

> random banks and IT companies in the world holds secret codes that are trusted by everyone to sign information that is used to establish trusted communications. If they wanted to, they could try to tamper with people's network connections and, if successful somehow, pretend to be anyone else that had used their secret codes to sign their information.

Quite a big difference, no?

That sentence doesn’t take the current situation into account. It’s not just “they” - the CA - that can do this, it’s anyone who can figure out their weak encryption key. Which makes the “if successful somehow” a whole lot more likely - consider what malware distributors can do with this, for example.

Even with the key, which is 4 apparently, you still need to impersonate another domain to have any success. That is hard to do unless you control people’s networks like in a WiFi hub.

If your argument is that we should stick rather closer to the RFCs and wire-level truths when explaining TLS and the eMuhdra situation to laypeople, I wish you all the best in your endeavor.

I find that communicating just enough to allow the formation of an roughly accurate threat model better retains attention; and in this particular situation I was being somewhat glib to emphasize the point of how insane our PKI system is.

> IF they first spook DNS

Or arp poison, or BGP hijack, or get in-path via tenancy shenanigans... TLS exists, premised on the literal assumption that such things are possible. If your argument is that we don't need to worry about a TLS weakness because such things are hard, I'd ask why we even bother then. CA compromise is the literal worst-case in PKI-world.

The private key is a red herring, it is not used for "encryption" as such.

The certs are used to validate website identity, whereupon key agreement is performed to establish a symmetric key that has nothing whatsoever to do with your certificate.

All that matters here-- all that we use the keypair for-- is to prove that each party "is who they say they are", and that is something your CA can lie about.

If a layperson understands,

    able to issue arbitrary certificates that an arbitrary browser will trust

    has the secret codes to everyone’s encryption

...then they're close enough, without digging into the RFCs, codicils, addendums, etc. They can perform a MITM, which is the literal thing that our PKI/TLS system is supposed to guarantee cannot happen.

The internet is a marketplace with a million vendors, each with their own stall.

In order to sell something in the market, you need to prove that you are who you say you are. There are about 200 trusted clerks whose job it is to check your papers and verify your identity. Once they're satisfied, they stamp your papers with an intricate stamp designed by the finest cryptographers.

Anyone seeing that stamp knows that a trusted clerk has checked your identity and approved your papers. Most people don't examine the stamp closely. They simply recognize it as belonging to one of the trusted clerks and accept it.

One of these clerks, however, instead of commissioning an intricate stamp from a master cryptographer, bought an ordinary rubber stamp from an office supply store.

One day, a particularly paranoid cryptographer was examining the stamps used throughout the market and noticed something peculiar about one of them. It wasn't intricate at all. In fact, it was so simple that anybody with a few dollars and a trip to the office supply store could make an identical stamp.

The clerk's job wasn't merely to stamp papers. The clerk was supposed to check that everything written on them was true before applying the stamp.

But now anyone could write whatever they wanted on their own papers and stamp them. The resulting documents would look exactly like ones that had been carefully checked and approved by the clerk.

A robber could write "thebank.com" on their papers, stamp them with the office supply rubber stamp, and present themselves as thebank.com. If they could get a customer to come to their stall instead of the real bank's, the customer would have no reason to suspect anything was wrong.

After all, the papers had the stamp of a trusted clerk. And everyone who trusted that clerk's stamp would believe them.

This is probably my favorite metaphor in this thread. Most of the others feel fairly stretched, but this one is less concerned with matching something in the real world 1:1, and I think as a result is clearer.

I told my wife the following: basically when you access a website like your bank, and you see the padlock in the address bar, that means that the computer the website is on has shown your computer a certificate saying that the same company that built the website you’re looking at owns the web address you’re going to.

Your computer has a built-in list of signatures that it trusts and expects to see on the certificates, and one of those signatures was eMudhra’s. These signatures are basically just a proof that you know a secret number without revealing the number itself. If you know the secret number, you can sign the certificate.

There are an unimaginable number of secret numbers. Imagine each atom in the Great Pyramid of Giza is a secret number. And then imagine you have as many Great Pyramids of Giza as there are atoms in the universe. And then double it.

Now imagine you choose any of the numbers represented by all those atoms to sign the certificate with, and you chose 4.

It’s not technically wrong: 4 is indeed a number. But if anyone wants to guess your number, and they start at 0, it won’t take them very long to find your secret number.

Once they’ve found your secret number, they can now sign certificates pretending to be you. So someone could pretend to be your bank, and present a certificate saying “yes, I am your bank” with a signature on it that your computer trusts.

It's a padlock with a code. The manufacturer makes the padlock with a specially made pin, so you can lock your front gate, and feel secure.

eMudhra sent you a padlock that had the code "4815" promising no one has ever used it or would be able to guess it, but all anyone really needed to try to get in is set the first number to "4" and ignore the rest.

It's not entirely accurate, but its accurate enough for them to get.

A car manufacturer that reused the same car key for every car.

Beyond that, they didn't even properly key the key! They carved one notch in by hand!

And the key is a LEGO brick.

And the key has no notches, and so inserting a screwdriver into the lock and turning works just as well as using the key.

I think this is the best parable - a master key with no notches.

You can use a lollipop to open it.

Except it's still not good enough, because you could use that key to eavesdrop nearly anything and anyone.

I'd refine this to, the cylinder for the lock did not care what key you put in, it woul open it anyways. So the key looks secure, but the lock is a joke.

4 notches

That's perilously close to a standard door key, and thats way too much security compared to these certs.

This is why we have pin tumbler mortise lock than the standard lever locks

That was reality in the eighties! You could open some cars using a popsicle stick as a key. Fun times!

Must have been a high trust society.

It was the reality with Kia a few years ago.

My dad used pliers to open the trunk! Even thought us how to do it so we could help him out.

One time after locking my keys in my '87 Toyota pickup, I just used a swiss army knife in desperation. Opened instantly

Hyundai & KIA did essentially that.

Weren't Mazda 626s notorious for this

And the key on top of that can be used to open every other car that exists.

They did!

As a 90s kid, the Dodge Omni was a common shitbox student car. I think they had like 8 key patterns lol.

My brother’s ignition key unlocked my friends’s trunk. There were a few people who could start other peoples cars. In one case, a soccer player “stole” a football players unlocked car as they looked identical and were parked near each other. In another as a prank we unlocked cars to roll them out of parking spots and physically lift them into unusual places.

The automobile key pool used to be small. Some Eastern European car manufacturers had only a few, the joke was they wouldn't get stolen: once you've been inside one you've had enough

>I can't come up with a metaphor or parable that's even remotely as ridiculous as what they've done

The best example I can think is (some) international borders: yeah, they're heavily regulated entities with lots of written protections (and thousands of miles of impenitrable barricades), but occassionally a hole opens up (whether physically or engineered).

Perhaps a section of border fence is occassionally destroyed (and people sneak in), but this won't happen if the border guards are approving [false] passports from a compromised government actor ("they have a valid passport, according to our inspection"), the border fence doesn't even matter!

Presume anybody can now go to that bad-passport-issuing government and request a passport to then enter any other country (i.e. the other country will see the passport as valid in the official global database): BAM, borders no longer mean anything; welcome to Privileged Accessia.

y'all underestimate your wives, i simply explained how PKI works in simple terms (alice/bob, public key, private key) and explained that they chose 4 as a private key instead of something complicated, she got it.

Everyone in your neighborhood knows your address, but someone discovered two days ago that they can get into your house by sticking a 4" oblong piece of paper into the keyhole. They put it on blast on Facebook, so now everyone in the whole planet is trying to break into your house.

keep it simple. They promised a door key with 10 grooves cut in it, but instead they gave you a door key with 1 groove cut in it.

And when that clicks, extend the metaphor, literally, to a key with ~384 grooves.

This scene from the classic comedy movie Spaceballs is a good one: https://youtu.be/B-NhD15ocwA?si=pcPfIRTgPVAurW1S

The killer is it's even dumber than that.

It's like finding out that all the deadbolt locks made by a company can be opened by an uncut key blank.

This is pretty much what I came up with.

Mine was the lock company selling locks but also making freely available keys that would open any of their locks.

This is the Lockpicking Lawyer, and what I have for you today is a eMudhra TLS certificate...

I have explained it to a few normies.

I start by saying this is about the tech behind the S in HTTPS. I say that the main point of this is that when you talk to foo.com, it has to prove that the people behind foo.com are on the other end, so it's safe to send them your encrypted password or whatever.

Then I say a bit about how the system works by having a small number of trustworthy companies vouch for other people's servers. This doesn't need too much technical detail to get the point across.

Then I say one of those "trustworthy" companies put an encryption key of 4, where it's supposed to be a long number that's hard to crack. This makes the verification easy to forge.

Then I say that everybody who runs a server needs to remove this company's bad key, and Windows or Mac or your phone needs updates too. And that your web browser probably already quietly removed it, which removes a lot of the risk.

I feel like when I explain it this way people get it.

> put an encryption key of 4

Hey the 4 was picked for good reason!

xkcd.com/221/

Its like finding out that for many years every minuteman silo in north america used the launch code "00000000"

You know how we got a lock on our door, and it opens only with our key? Turns out someone made a lock which looked secure, but actually opened when you said the word "friend" - and then engraved "speak, friend, and enter" on the door.

Imagine a hospital. Among other procedures, they offer people heart surgeries. It goes on for several years and it turns out that the scalpel, used for doing surgeries, was contaminated with AIDS for all those years.

And then the hospital director issues a statement, where they say "Well, actually, heart surgeries account for only 1% of the total number of procedures we've performed! We can easily afford to stop doing them, it's not a big deal."

  - you know how some people have passwords like 1234
  - ha ha yeah what idiots
  - what do you think an internet infrastructure company password is like
  - idk something long and hard to remember
  - 4
  - lolwat

I told my fiance it was a bit like if a company that produces keypad door locks accidentally added a master code (115) which works on every single door and has for the last two years.

Yours is much funnier!

Why do you need an analogy? Analogies are always bad. Encryption relies on long complicated numbers, but they made the number instead of long and complicated just the number “4”. Which is actually harder than using a long and complicated number because it’s basically all automated so we don’t even know how They fucked it up this bad.

How about, someone is selling a secure box of some sort, and their factory starts putting glitter nail polish over the screws that hold it together, as is sometimes done for security reasons.

Then the intern decides, “I can just glue these identical little white circles with blue sparkles onto the screw, and it will be faster and I can take more breaks!”

I'm also wondering who the hell would use a registrar called "eMudhra" with Arial font in the subtext in their logo. It's so incredibly 90s.

I'm actually being serious, I do judge companies by their logo and website design taste, and more modern-looking companies also tend to pay more attention to doing things properly.

It's like if a manufacturer of bank vaults accidentally let all their vaults be opened by the code 0000

A car manufacturer sold cars that had straight keys with no teeth for years and nobody noticed.

Sure this happened in the physical space in 2004

https://jeffwerner.ca/kryptonite_lock/

People swapped out their bike locks en masse, it was a pain.

A lock factory that’s supposed to make unbreakable locks, yet all of the locks/keys are identical. Suddenly everyone can use such a key to open any door of the internet.

Not 100% accurate, but conveys how stupid and incompetent all this is.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_JNGI1dI-e8 except the password is for everyone's luggage, and it can't be changed

The Hyundai/Kia cars where a USB-A connector fit the lock actuator and was enough to start the car, so enough got stolen that insurance companies stopped issuing policies for them.

The same Kias & Hyundais were sold in South Korea, but their auto theft rate is 60x lower than the US.[1] Car theft rates are mostly determined by how effectively car thieves are caught & punished, not by how secure the car is.

1. 4.7 per 100k people per year vs 288.5: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motor_vehicle_theft#Motor_vehi...

Or because america doesn't regulate immobilisers like most other countries and has a race to the bottom mba mindset to save a few pennies vs the public good.

That's not correct. Immobilizers are not common in Japan or South Korea, both of which have extremely low auto theft rates. Canada has mandated immobilizers since 2007 and its auto theft rate is 248.5 per 100k per year, which is only slightly lower than the US, but still 17 times higher than Japan and 50 times higher than South Korea. Immobilizers have also been required in Australia since 2001, but its auto theft rate is the same as Canada.

If you measure auto theft rate per vehicle (not per person), then the US has the same rate as Canada. There are 16% more auto thefts per capita in the US, but the US also has 17% more cars per capita than Canada.

If lack of immobilizers was the main factor, Canada would have significantly lower auto theft rates than the US, and countries that mandated immobilizers would not have theft rates 15x higher than countries where they were uncommon. Neither of these are true, so immobilizers are most likely not the main factor in auto theft rates.

Auto theft rates are mostly determined by car ownership rates and the number of auto thieves on the street. The number of auto thieves on the street is determined by how quickly they are caught, and how long they are locked up for. Auto theft recidivism rates are higher than any other crime, including drug offenses. Around 80% are re-arrested within 3 years of being released. Considering the clearance rate for auto theft is around 10%, that means the average auto thief is stealing a lot of cars before being caught again, and the actual recidivism rate is higher than 80%.

Usa has 37% higher theft rate than Australia.

And I'm sure Hyundai and kia stats would be much higher due to lack of immobiliser and visibility of how easy they are to steal on social media.

That's not true. In 2025, Australia's auto theft rate was 241.4 per 100k people.[1] In the US last year, the rate was less than 200 per 100k people.[2]

1. 66,625 vehicle thefts divided by a population of 27,600,000. https://www.abs.gov.au/statistics/people/crime-and-justice/r...

2. 659,880 vehicle thefts divided by a population of 341,784,857 is 193 per 100k. https://www.nicb.org/news/news-releases/us-vehicle-thefts-ex...

I described it like it was a company selling the highest security locks to companies that needed them, then one day someone discovered you could open the door with a toothpick.

They put a lot of effort into building a very secure safe, thick steel walls, can survive a fire forever, too heavy to move.

Then they locked it with the key you find on a chew toy for a baby.

A special locksmith who's entrusted enough to do the locks of all the important bank vaults in town used the pass code 1234 for every bank vault in town.

From Spaceballs:

https://youtu.be/a6iW-8xPw3k?is=IFYVVkYnlKQk1uh7

Low quality tech company cuts corners seems pretty on point

concrete manufacture occasionally builds houses.

house collapses and people get injured.

concrete manufacture says we no longer build houses cause it’s too small of a business.

One company prints identity cards with a hologram to prevent copying. Another company puts on a dot with a crayon.

It’s like the skeleton key for all the locks in the neighbourhood is actually just a straight metal rod.

They cut a key for their lock, but instead of using the 4-5 tumblers they only used 1.

we could stick with the metaphor of keys. The modern web requires fancy ones capable of hundreds of notches. The company in question basically skipped the step of notches and just used the blank key

i'd say it's like a consumer security system was installed but the installer had remote access but they left the passcode as 0000 on everyone's devices

I used passports.

Everyone agrees that passports aren't made by one company or one country, yet all countries accept passports.

Not everyone can just start making passports though, it's a complicated process of gaining trust and validation as a "real country" before you can issue passports.

One "country" started using a bit of paper that said "trust me bro" and everyone had to treat it as a valid passport. Worse, the way the internet works is that the border guards don't actually see who issued the passport, only that one of the trusted countries produced it.

Having passports this easy to forge means anyone can anyone.

"We're designing/running the lottery. You get to pick the winning numbers, in secret, obviously so no one will know. There are millions of numbers you can pick from, using a random system so it's all trustworthy. Instead of drawing a random ball out, and another and another, you write down the number 4 on a bit of paper and go home for the day thinking it's a job well done. No one noticed because they all expected it to take up to a million guesses, until someone just asked if it was 4"

There’s an xkcd for this: https://xkcd.com/221/

Ever seen Spaceballs?

“That's the stupidest combination I've ever heard in my life! That's the kinda thing an idiot would have on his luggage!”

i explain it by using Donald Trump: There is the atomic football (a case traveling with Trump so he can initiate a atomic war even while playing golf). The combination of the lock an the "Football" obviously is 0-0-0-0-0-0, But Tramp has problems remembering the order of the digits in the combination.

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