No, that's not obvious at all. It seems like a perfect way to demonstrate the danger of the category as a whole, then position yourself as learning from your mistakes and willing to cooperate/support/advise.
More perfect than simply not making mistakes and allowing your competitors to make mistakes (or to, apparently, fake mistakes in their own attempt to get regulated)?
Regulators reading OpenAI's 99th mea culpa: "Ah yes, well I bet they've figured it out this time! We should regulate everyone else!" Lol what a joke.
I don't think any of them are in a position to allow or not allow their competitors to make mistakes.
The point that you're not getting here is that the advantage comes from actually being seen to make mistakes, and then signalling contrition and commitment to rectify them. That persuades people of both the need for regulation, and their own subsequent responsibility (which implies trustworthiness to participate in the regulation).
> Regulators reading OpenAI's 99th mea culpa: "Ah yes, well I bet they've figured it out this time! We should regulate everyone else!"
Again you're not getting it. The drive isn't to "regulate everyone else", it's to regulate everyone, period. The whole point of regulatory capture is being able to (a) use regulatory compliance as a competitive advantage, and (b) influence the regulatory regime in your favor -- you want to be a target of regulation just as much as your competitors in order to achieve that.
Messaging that the whole industry needs to be regulated, but that you're ready and willing to work with the regime, is exactly how you do regulatory capture. Demonstrating that you are capable of completely mitigating risk on your own without any intervention is an argument against regulation from the outset.
Of course they are, by your own hypothesis. You believe it makes sense for the other parties to engage in this behavior. If it makes sense, then they will do that reliably, and one entity can just defect and stand above the rest.
> The point that you're not getting here is that the advantage comes from actually being seen to make mistakes
Ah yes, the ol' "I just do retarded shit so people think I'm a genius" trick. Who could possibly doubt the strategic genius or umm... existence... of such a strategy.
> Again you're not getting it.
No, I understand it completely. Obviously regulatory capture only works if it in reality inflicts asymmetric costs on other parties.
I'm not sure what hypotheses I've proposed that suggests I think one organization has control of the behavior of entirely other organizations -- can you explain where you think you've seen this?
> Ah yes, the ol' "I just do retarded shit so people think I'm a genius" trick. Who could possibly doubt the strategic genius or umm... existence... of such a strategy.
Well, I suppose anyone who sees the extent to which such a strategy might be effective at achieving their goals might be included to do so.
I believe both myself and others have made a plausible case as how messaging "we've created something we can't control without political intervention" has the dual effect of both increasing the perceived value of the product itself, and laying the groundwork for regulatory capture in a market where early dominant players have a natural incentive to pursue regulatory intervention.
I don't see how characterizing the situation as simplistically as you're attempting to do here functions as a meaningful counter-argument.
> No, I understand it completely. Obviously regulatory capture only works if it in reality inflicts asymmetric costs on other parties.
No, I don't think the "only" works there. There are plenty of ways that regulatory capture can advantage one party over another without it being based on economies of scale or cost thresholds.
One way is to influence regulations such their qualitative requirements directly target non-cost-related aspects that distinguish the firms from each other, e.g. placing restrictions that burden or favor product features or operating practices already implemented by some firms and not others, or targeting non-operational aspects that distinguish firms, like their board composition or financial structure.
1)Good standing with the administration/lobbying
2)Large capital for compliance
3)Closed frontier models
Oh, would you look at FelonyBench! It seems that the top scores are from companies exactly like this that boast about the crimes committed by themselves on social media all the time.