"Security is for losers"
> Andy Yen, the CEO of Proton, had a message for an employee in the company’s security Slack channel who urged the company to at least take a few days to pentest newly written code before pushing it live. “That’s bullshit and loser thinking. Of course it’s possible to be fast and secure,” Yen wrote in the channel at the end of August. “Stop thinking always of how to be slower, and focus more on how to be faster.” In a follow-up message, Yen reiterated his point: “only losers think like that.” His ultimate message for the team was to “stop lovingly handcrafting all our code and use AI more.”
Proton CEO Andy Yen: "This will be the last year that we hire engineers." - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50295112 - October 2026
Manifestos, Fear, and 'Loser Thinking': Inside Proton's AI Reckoning - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50289692 - October 2026
Good luck.
Edit: There appears to be some consequences for acting like this and those actions being made public.
Proton's CEO Cancels AI 'Re-Interviews' - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50307183 - October 2026
Charlie Munger once said, "Show me the incentives, and I'll show you the outcomes." There are very, very, very few actual incentives to operate a real infosec effort at most companies. Think about it: how many companies have you heard of going out-of-business because of breaches? If you're like most Americans, you've probably received at least one letter from some company you did business with telling you that their systems were compromised and your data may or may not have been stolen as a result. They'll usually close out the letter with an offer of free credit monitoring for some finite length of time. Since that's useless and a lawsuit is a pain in the ass with no guarantee of benefit, the vast majority of people simply sigh and toss the letter in the trash.
There's no real way to pin identity theft or other consequences on a given data breach, so it's hard to make any sort of claim that way.
At the end of the day, the company has saved money by not instituting best InfoSec practices and red-teaming their software on a routine basis. There are no civil or criminal penalties for them not doing so.
So they don't.
Now in some countries those with data security office role have more to worry about than only losing their job, if they sign off on something that isn't qualified to be out there in first place.
https://germancomplianceinstitute.com/blogs/news/personal-li...
Homer: “There’s three ways to do things. The right way, the wrong way, and the Max Power way!
Lisa: "Isn’t that also the wrong way?"
Homer: "Yeah, but... faster.”
Says who? For what purpose? To whose benefit?
I want my encrypted email company to move slow, deliberately, and very carefully.
I'd like most software in general to move slower. Some, I'd like to not move at all. I hate churn for churn's sake, or piling useless features just so you pretend you did something to justify your subscription pricing, both of which were already the norm before AI and are worse now.
To speak in Apple terms, we don't miss more and faster crap novelties. We miss the Snow Leopard releases.
The trouble is that executives are bonused on much shorter time scales, and they run the company.
No, not necessarily. Sometimes, yes. For anything important, the last thing I want is a company that's moving too fast.
An email company? The base protocol RFC was written in the 70s. It's as mature as computer technology gets. There is zero value in moving fast here, all the value is in building an absolutely rock solid and secure solution.
The very opposite of move fast and break things.
Tone deaf award of the decade surely goes to that guy.
If it were some social game app or something, I guess it wouldn't be as tragic, but for a company whose sole reason to exist is to provide security... wow. Goodbye any trust ever again.
Either he's been like this the entire time, trying to crack the whip and failing, and thus a bad leader who has repeatedly failed to get results, or he's (as his employees have said) very deep in AI Psychosis and completely abandoned his principles.
It doesn't matter which it is, they're both extremely damning for the company and his leadership.
As if that's a problem? I want them to be my fucking encrypted email. Not a calendar. Not a backup. Not a VPN. And they've already stretched to all kinds of shit.
My point is they announced they’d ship a calendar in 2019 and it took 2 years to ship a full release and 3 to ship an iOS app.
It also sort of sucks, and in 2024 (year 5) they announced they’re rebuilding it. The rebuild partially shipped in 2026.
For a guy suddenly obsessed with speed these timelines are even more absurd.
"Any man who must say 'I am the king' is no true king." The measure is not who you can bully and denigrate successfully, but who will follow you to hell.
And whose idea of a strong man is this? I don't think many people would follow Putin to hell willingly, or that he accepts any criticism, or accept being challenged on his ideas. But he could be called a "strong man", at least the kind of "strong man" some people aspire to be.
Patrick Stewart taught us what good men do with power - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50327650 - November 2026
You can also read about people talking about this in the super-early computer user communities. When you had to be a bit crazy to even be interested in computers you ended up with people who were outliers in a lot of other ways too. As more people came in to the space it would regress to the mean... this is one of the things that "regression to the mean" can be regressing from.
Social contagion [0] (not to be confused for memetics [1]) involves behaviour, emotions, or conditions spreading spontaneously through a group or network. [...] Throughout history all social contagions have had a single thing in common: the people who follow them genuinely believe their group is only doing positive effects, and cannot rationalize negative effects from within their group.
Tech executives are a group (and a network), its not some "regression to the mean" its common human social behaviour within group dynamics. It's not just those two there has been a progressive slide of executives joining the 'tech-bro' subgroup.
I'd also suggest that companies being so blasé is a direct result of lacking regulation. If there was no laws about aviation safety I bet we'd have more airlines with lax safety standards and more accidents.
Because humans were, loosely speaking, careful about not making egregious security mistakes, most security vulnerabilities turned out to be either harmless or the result of a programming language allowing the type of exploit to begin with.
But now we have code from non-people ordered by people who both don't care about security at all.
That means you will get maximally bad security outcomes which in turn will make governments consider regulating the software development industry. They are speed running their own demise.
Mmmmm... I think I may have to score this particular point for the CEO. Lovingly handcrafted code has been many things over the past 30 years, but "secure" is not one of the adjectives I'd apply to it. Anyone who thinks that the lovingly handcrafted code has always just been wonderfully secure needs to check the tint on their glasses.
A proper AI setup probably can produce more secure code more quickly than conventional development processes... however one of the keys will be to understand that yes, that will still be slower than writing code that is not rather carefully analyzed for security and a company like Proton had better have a strong commitment to never, ever skipping that step because it's slowing them down or it got expensive. "Proper" in "proper AI setup" is the most important word.
But that's not to say that I'm endorsing everything else he said. Even if it is true that companies will be able to stop hiring engineers, which at the moment I seriously doubt [1], a company like Proton should expect to be one of the last companies who can do that, not be getting publicly excited about it first. Hey we dumped all our engineers because our managers can just prompt our AIs just as well here in October 2026 would definitely be a "instantly cancel any Proton services I had" signal for me.
[1]: One of the things I don't expect to change is that there are plenty of people I would describe my actual day-to-day work to and they would consider it a living hell if they had to do it. I still quite enjoy it overall. And there are plenty of jobs that other people love and I would consider a living hell. Even in 25 years that's going to be the case. There will be people willing to put up with the process of working with the system to create this stuff... but the people who are willing to be professional about this, do the QA, do the work beyond the first fun prompts, is going to be a minority, and an even smaller minority who take the time to get good at it. There will always be people who are better and people who are worse.
Of course, AI reviewers and security tools will catch some security errors, but this should come as an addition to a proper security design, not instead of it.
Lol, brave words in an age of $6B heists and major CVEs every week.
At the appropriate and necessary cost.
A less costly new engine design or less costly engine swap procedure that fails is worse than no airplane at all. If it's cheaper and fails, we don't want it. It wasn't cheaper, it was even worse than expensive.
It's not hyperbolic all or nothing. Sure infinite cost is just as useless as infinite failure, but there is no reason to talk about infinite.
At what cost? Some. At some cost.
This doesn't address how the cost of safety related procedures versus the cost of risks mitigated is calculated (which is way harder than saying "some") so that the buyer can actually know what "some" cost is.
It's also not addressing the parent comment's point: the bad outcomes in aviation tend to be very impactful (both in human safety and financially), so the tolerance for mistakes is way lower.
Compared to cybersecurity for a brochureware website, where it takes a far larger stretch to go from "security incident" to "someone's dead". (Also, people in cybersecurity aren't going to accept "it has some cost, and you might buy it if it's not too expensive".)
You could ask: is it _worth_ making it that safe? But we don't ask that. We just make it that safe.
I think there is a good point to be made that this level of safety (it costs what it costs) is probably not worth it for cybersecurity, in general, even if it's largely considered worth it for commercial aviation.
The only real question is how much damage will be caused before that happens.
It's fine for cheap pans to exist because any user of one can see what it is and make an informed choice to use the junk one or the good one.
Probably not all of software, but basically all of our financial infrastructure, operational infrastructure and communications infrastructure is either already critically dependent on software, or heading that way.
I think that the EU's DORA act is probably the way things will head. We'll regulate the outcomes and ensure that these services can be maintained.
Honestly, the only reason that this hasn't already happened is that the US government is wildly against basically all regulation of software. I figure that if we end up in some kind of cybersecurity crash (likely, given the current trajectory) that we'll get lots and lots of regulation.
And to be honest, this will be for the better in the long term, but it'll probably suck for all of us in the short term (but at least there'll be jobs).
https://assets.performance.gov/APG/files/2023/june/FY2023_Ju... states on page 5 that they're aiming to cut fatalities in half from 8.9 per 100M passengers in FY 2009 to 4.4 fatalities per 100M passengers in FY 2025. (It looks like they were doing way better than that goal.) "As low as reasonably practical" (ALARP) seems to be the term for aviation, which is very clearly not a zero fatalities goal.
> You could ask: is it _worth_ making it that safe? But we don't ask that. We just make it that safe.
They... Don't? Aviation accidents continue to happen and they will continue to happen. They've decided that a positive number of fatalities is worth it not because they want anyone to die, but because they know that perfection is impossible. You can't achieve it, and you can't know that you've achieved it.
Defense in depth is the idea. Swiss cheese model of failure.
Jokes aside, you can’t get anywhere near zero fault unless to impose strict operating regulations , requirements and procedures and regular checks… just like in aviation.
And even there, boeing manages to fuck it up somehow.