Disk encryption on NetBSD – achieving secrecy
netbsd.org
netbsd.org
Seems this page uses a weak notion of "secret contents", since it doesn't encrypt the system packages, only user data and some configuration files.
Maybe I don't want anybody to know I have installed Tor on my system, in some countries this is illegal.
If you're running a relay then traffic gives you away. For tor on netbsd with a typical install it'll land in /usr/pkg bin and etc folders with data in /var/chroot/tor logging to /var/log/tor and usual script /etc/rc.d/tor and its own user and group tor.
Only FDE would hide that but thats a different threat model entirely.
Encrypting instead of verifying would still allow for evil maid attacks since they can just replace it with something that ask for a key and never really does anything with it other than sending it to a remote server.
To reply to your "And where is the trust store database stored by default?": The root store would be the motherboards secure boot databases for the signed bootloader (or kernel if doing direct boot). the following steps can verify however they like. E.g. something like ParticleOS[0] uses the roothash of the usr-verity partition, which was embedded into the signed UKI.
I do not think "system packages" are usefully secret and there are many downsides to treating them as such, so I am satisfied just verifying they have not been tampered with, but you can encrypt other disk slices too if you feel super strongly about this.