DKIM2 – Every system that handles an email signs for what it did
dkim2.com
dkim2.com
Plus, Microsoft never actually supported it: despite KB articles outlining "this is how you trust remote ARC signers for your O365 tenant", enabling these options did literally nothing: inbound mail would continue to be Forefront-disappeared with the exact same (excessive-yet-meaningless) headers as before.
Up to this day, there is no documented/supported way to configure an O365 tenant to "always accept all messages from this sender", despite customer demand.
So, yeah, another mark in the "unchallenged anti-competitive behavior" column against MSFT. Maybe the recent "O364" outage will give rise to a victims' movement, but, yeah, I sort-of doubt it.
And, despite claims to the contrary, DKIM2 isn't widely supported yet, and it's as-of-now unclear if it ever will be. But, with SEO-stuffing-LLM-muppets like https://stalw.art/blog/dkim2-dmarcbis/ poisoning the well, it's becoming very hard to tell which is which.
Spoiler: DMARCbis is even less "there" than DKIM2.
[0]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thain-ipv8-00.html
It really feels like all this is proof-of-system-administrator-work more than anything else.
No, it really isn't. Besides breaking forwarding, it's sort-of OK, and steps are being taken to address the remaining painpoint(s).
If you want email to survive, enthusiastically embracing DKIM and SPF, and grudgingly accepting DMARC are the only options...