Optimizely compromised, served malware on Zoom, GitLab
blog.report-uri.com
blog.report-uri.com
I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.
We should also enforce antitrust laws.
Open source is already expensive from a time standpoint, you wanna make it expensive from a monetary standpoint too?
There should be standards that people have to live up to if they are going to provide a product, even for free, to others.
If your website is making any requests outside of the original domain, there's no "accidental" in anything the website does.
I never really understood this idiom, because how can a PHB engineering manager (for example) be required to not understand their team's technology in order to retain their job? Surely if that manager knows their team's work inside out then they would be a more effective manager - which is good for everyone?
If I squint-my-brain, I can see how (for example) that anyone who works full-time as an SEO "consultant" in the year 2026 would only be if they actually believed that SEO tricks actually worked, which requires them to not understand how modern search-engines' spiders actually work (because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s). Am I close?
In this case, it's the dangers of the tracking and advertising frameworks being used for hostile purposes.
I know we really like mass incarceration in America. But maybe start with civil liability and a private right to enforcement?
--Upton Sinclair
We got 10MB of javascript (maybe 10 years ago...) because engineering needs to build one frontend with multi browser and multi screen support so they picked an off-the-shelf do-everything framework like Amber or Angular, or a react/redux build with 300 nested dependencies.
The most infuriating thing, when you do remove these tags, marketing forgets they exist and are like "Oh we don't use that anymore".
Often also true for software development, unfortunately.
Not going to happen. Most decisions in tech do not factor in risk, only cost. Risk mitigation usually requires considerable spend, and very few people/companies are willing to spend on low-probability events.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
It doesn't cost them anything but a "whoops" post when they fuck up, so the incentive is misaligned (as you noted under repercussions).
The cost is externalised onto everyone else not them so it's not going to change.
Who cares? Next week you forget about this and move on
This is the bare minimum. Automatic 3rd party requests should be considered data unsolicited data disclosure under GDPR.
From what I could tell, the malware just generally looked at anything on the page, in cookies/local storage, or clipboard that looks like a crypto address or credit card number. So for sites like CNN or BBC they shouldn't be able to do much damage unless there is a subscription page for example that takes credit card number.
However, the malware also delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which do take advantage of browser vulnerabilities in iOS to cause more serious damage.
The model is broken on fundamental level and it will never be fixed.
Isn't this anomalous? using RCE root chains in mass-delivered malware? Seems like a new precedent.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
It would not have helped here. gitlab.com and my bank are on the list. Obviously I could not have blocked them.
Per the linked article, those are not the domains where the malicious JS was served from.
Was a pain though on eCommerce sites as they'd often switch payment processors and then you had to do the whole dance of partially successful payments until you found the right set of allow lists.
Optimizely, or Episerver as it was previously called, was such a pleasure to work on - but since version 13 they more or less vendor locked you into their own authentication (Opti ID / Entra AD (?)) and their Optimizely Graph for search and content look up. You can keep self-hosting but you won't get access to Opti Id or Graph if you're not on their tenant.
I guess this is the inevitable happen - everyone gets hacked at the same time when hosting on a SaaS platform.
All of that for them to mess their own security.
If it was on me, I would stop using them.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
I think it's not used because they are continuously updating their scripts for users.
Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?
[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits
Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"
> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.
> On mobile, Report URI says they attempted to install exploit kids.
The models are using language correctly, but their whole universe is limited to a single session. They're not aware that all the previous sessions also used the same phrase, that you've seen it 10 times in the last hour, etc.
Humans naturally avoid repeating the exact same phrases and jokes they just heard from several other sources, but sometimes you can see the same phenomenon with people too: when there's new bullshit phrase or trend spreading through tiktok/instagram (or popular press), there's a brief moment you can catch many normies regurgitating the exact same phrase "independently".
The front of the meme virality wave sure does look weird.
whereas the one that we are commenting on now looks like an ad: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w...
It opens with:
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can ...
It's otherwise nearly the same information.
It would be kind of ironic if the hijacking warning article got hijacked, I guess?
2. The former seems super more clear to me to be AI generated prose.
3. The latter explicitly continue talks about the actions they took, that they reached out to the affected parties, etc. From a quick scan, it does not appear that the former claims to have done anything themself?
Sorry I had to say it ;-)
“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I wish SRI could be used more,
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.
As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site.
It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model.
If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason. This alone should end the company. It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should.
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A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface. People should take advantage of it.
There's a reason browser vendors now force basically all extensions into a strict CSP by default... https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manif... They won't even let you manually relax it anymore.
Never load third-party JavaScript on your site. Zero exceptions.
https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
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0.0.0.0 cdn.optimizely.com
...and now I have another reason to keep it there.I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
Can't wait until they start killing hardware
Somehow this sentence immediately flags this article as AI slop.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
First thing I add to my agents.md is do not use third party libraries, frameworks, fonts, icons, etc unless strictly necessary, ask first
any program code should run on the webserver
browsers should be minimalist and only support html