I read a compelling article recently (I can't for the life of me remember where) that makes precisely the opposite argument, which is that misconduct arises from a breakdown of stratification and the subjection of everything to competitive market pressures. In a world where what mattered is who your parents were and where you went to school and where you summered, there was substantially less incentive to fake outputs than one in which your outputs are carefully measured and compared against the outputs of your counter parts.
Not that I think a meritocratic world isn't better than the one we left behind. But I find that misconduct arising from the pressures of meritocracy better fits the available data than the theory you present.
[1] In 1965, a lawyer at a large firm might bill 1200-1600 hours per year, versus 1800-2200 today. This increase has been the result of the breakdown of long-term client relationships and the consequent increase in the competition for business and for rainmaker partners with business. What do you think that this increase does to the incentive structure vis-a-vis misconduct? Can you see how the same basic story has played out in many different fields, including academia?