I never used https on my sites because there are some giant warnings ("dangerous") in browser when you go to a website that is self-signed. No warnings on plain http.
I never used https on my sites because there are some giant warnings ("dangerous") in browser when you go to a website that is self-signed. No warnings on plain http.
I do agree that the extreme mistrust of browsers towards self-signed certificates is an odd thing.
No, not at all; it's the whole point of SSL. The guy MITMing an SSLed website can create a cert for that site himself, but he can't get it signed by a CA. So he has to sign it himself. Thus, from the browser's perspective, all self-signed certs are possible instances of "there used to be a CA-signed cert here, but now you're being MITMed."
Now, that's not to say something like self-signed certs wouldn't be nice--given some sort of distributed pin cache, we could have something closer to an SSH/PGP model where everyone's current self-signed cert "fingerprint" is on file, and alarm bells go off if you see a cert different from the one you're supposed to see. But without that, self-signing is literally no more secure than no SSL at all: anyone else can also self-sign to MITM you.
I strongly doubt that.
Ideally, browsers would store the certificate presented on the first visit to a website and compare the certificate presented on following visits to that stored certificate to warn the user on mismatches – so far, I have not yet found a usable implementation thereof, and especially not one more widespread than CAcert.
[0] Among them such trustworthy companies as DigiTrust, TÜRKTRUST or CNNIC.